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1. Introduction 
 
Expectations matter in determining current and future macroeconomic outcomes. Hence, the 
management of private expectations has become a central feature of monetary policy, as 
private agents’ interpretation of central bank decisions and communication is central to the 
formation of their beliefs (Woodford, 2005). One way in which some central banks 
communicate is by publishing macroeconomic projections. While there is variation in terms 
of the variables forecasted, and how those projections are published, a number of central 
banks – including the Bank of England, Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Riksbank, 
Norges Bank and Reserve Bank of New Zealand – release projections on a regular basis.  
 
In the meantime, and despite a considerable empirical literature, there is still uncertainty 
about the effects of monetary shocks.1 The sign and magnitude of the responses of private 
beliefs and economic variables to monetary policy may depend on the identification strategy, 
the state of the economy, the specification of the model considered, and the relative  
information sets of policymakers and private agents. This paper aims at assessing, in the 
presence of information frictions, the effect of monetary shocks when accounting for the 
publication of central bank macroeconomic projections. 
 
In a framework with perfect information, private agents are able to infer the pure monetary 
innovation from the central bank’s policy decision based on their knowledge of its reaction 
function. However, in a set-up with information frictions and more particularly non-nested 
information sets, private agents cannot infer the pure monetary shock from the policy 
decision without central bank macroeconomic projections. When the central bank and 
private agents have different information sets, the policy decision can convey information 
about the central bank’s view of macroeconomic developments, influencing private beliefs 
about the future economic outlook. 2  The reaction of private expectations to the policy 
decision may therefore reflect a mix of the responses to the pure monetary innovation and to 
the macroeconomic information conveyed by the policy instrument. In that case, an increase 
in the policy rate could signal to private agents that an inflationary shock will hit the 
economy in the future, causing higher private inflation expectations and so higher inflation.3 
Yet, the same increase in the policy rate may be interpreted as a contractionary monetary 
shock, which will lower private inflation expectations and so inflation. 
 
Private agents’ interpretation of changes in the policy rate is therefore crucial in determining 
the sign and magnitude of the effect of monetary policy actions. Because this interpretation 
of policy decisions in turn depend on the differences between information sets of 
policymakers and private agents, the publication of central bank macroeconomic projections 
may affect the impact of the policy decision. This paper aims to assess the extent to which the 
effect of monetary shocks depends on the information disclosed by central bank 
macroeconomic projections. In other words, do central bank macroeconomic projections help 
private agents to infer the true monetary shock? 
 
This paper investigates, for the United Kingdom (UK), whether and how the term structure 
of market-based inflation expectations, measured with inflation swaps, responds to the Bank 
                                                          
1 See Sims (1972), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Romer and Romer (2004), Coibion (2012), Gertler and Karadi 
(2015), Miranda-Agrippino (2016), and Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2017). 
2 Melosi (2017) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2017) study this signalling channel of monetary policy. 
3 The signalling channel of monetary policy might then be one explanation for the positive response of inflation to 
monetary shocks documented in the VAR literature as the “price puzzle” (Sims 1992) and would be consistent 
with Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) that including inflation expectations in VARs captures this price puzzle. 
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of England’s (BoE) policy decisions and to their interaction with BoE macroeconomic 
projections. If the publication of macroeconomic projections, by facilitating information 
processing and signal extraction, helps private agents to infer the true monetary innovation, 
then the usual negative effect of contractionary monetary policy on private inflation 
expectations should not be mitigated by the signalling channel of monetary policy, and 
should therefore be amplified. 
 
This paper makes use of a specific feature of the BoE data to overcome the main empirical 
challenge of this paper. The research question requires that the central bank projections are 
not a function of the current policy decision so both the monetary shocks and the projection 
surprises can be separately identified. In this particular dataset, BoE projections are 
conditioned on the market interest rate instead of the policy rate, so BoE projections are 
orthogonal to contemporary policy decisions, a necessary feature for identification issues. 
 
Two additional features of this paper are worth stressing. First, its focus is on the effects of 
the release of central bank macroeconomic information, not on policy announcements, 
communication about the future path of policy, the Forward Guidance policy (see e.g. 
Andrade et al. 2015; Campbell et al. 2016) or whether communication is relatively more 
hawkish or dovish (see e.g. Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007; Rosa and Verga, 2007). Second, 
this paper focuses on quantitative communication and abstracts from quantification issues of 
qualitative communication like statements, minutes and speeches (see Blinder et al., 2008, for 
a review and Hubert, 2017, for a comparison of the effects of both types of communication). 
 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is to analyse whether the publication of 
central bank macroeconomic projections modifies the effect of monetary shocks. Given that 
facilitating private agents’ information processing has been put forward as one reason why 
central banks complement their actions with communication, we document this 
interdependence and assess its impact on the term structure of private inflation expectations. 
 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we deal with the issue of endogeneity by 
extracting series of exogenous shocks to the BoE’s policy rate and to its inflation and output 
projections by removing their systematic component, following the identification 
methodology of Romer and Romer (2004) applied to UK data by Cloyne and Huertgen 
(2016). 4  Blanchard et al. (2013) and Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2017) discuss how 
information frictions modify the econometric identification problem. To account for potential 
non-nested information sets, we augment the Romer and Romer (2004) approach so that 
monetary shocks are not only orthogonal to the central bank’s information set but also to 
private agents’ information set. Second, we estimate the effects of monetary shocks on 
private inflation expectations conditional on BoE projection surprises in a framework 
derived from the information frictions literature and controlling for news shocks.5  
 
We find that private inflation expectations on average respond negatively to contractionary 
monetary shocks, as would be expected given the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. Our main result however is that BoE inflation projections do modify the effect of 
monetary shocks on inflation expectations. First, contractionary monetary shocks have more 
                                                          
4 Because the policy rate is at its effective lower bound during a significant part of our sample and monetary 
policy has taken many different dimensions over the last years, we use a shadow rate to capture all dimensions of 
monetary policy into a single variable of the monetary stance. 
5 The use of market-based inflation expectation measured by inflation swaps as our dependent variables calls for 
correcting for term, liquidity and inflation risk premia. We use the regression based approach following the 
methodology used by Gürkaynak et al. (2010a, 2010b) and Soderlind (2011). 
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negative effects in months when the central bank publishes its macroeconomic projections, 
especially since the conventional policy instrument has approached the Zero Lower Bound 
(ZLB) and the central bank has turned to unconventional instruments. In quantitative terms, 
a 100 basis points exogenous increase in the policy rate would reduce on impact 1-year 
inflation expectations by 0.08 basis points when no projections are published and by 0.11 
basis points when central bank projections are published. Second, during months when the 
central bank publishes its macroeconomic projections, a positive shock to the shadow policy 
rate – i.e. a contractionary monetary shock – has a more negative effect on inflation 
expectations when interacted with a positive surprise to the Bank’s inflation projections (a 
100 basis point increase in the policy rate reduces 1-year inflation expectations by 18 basis 
points on impact in this case). In contrast, when a contractionary monetary shock is 
interacted with a negative surprise to the Bank’s inflation projections, there is no effect on 
private inflation expectations.  
 
This finding suggests that when monetary shocks and projection surprises corroborate each 
other, monetary shocks have more impact on private inflation expectations, possibly because 
private agents are able to infer the true policy innovation and to uncover the stance of 
monetary policy. When monetary shocks and projection surprises contradict each other, 
monetary shocks have no (or less) impact, possibly because private agents receive opposite 
signals and are not able to infer the true policy innovation. So they respond to the 
macroeconomic information disclosed, as described by the “signalling channel of monetary 
policy”. Finally, the same is not true of output projection surprises, although that might be 
consistent with the remit of an inflation targeting central bank, such as the Bank of England. 
 
These findings show that the publication of central bank inflation projections provides 
information that private agents view as useful, helps private agents’ information processing 
and signal extraction and therefore changes their response to policy decisions. They give 
policymakers insights on how private agents interpret and use central bank macroeconomic 
information. The coordination of policy decisions and macroeconomic projections appears 
important for the management of private inflation expectations and for the transmission and 
effectiveness of monetary policy.6 
 
This paper suggests that providing guidance about future projections of inflation rather than 
future projections of interest rates – the Forward Guidance (FG) policy – may actually 
enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy by better allowing private agents to distinguish 
between the information set of the central bank and the appropriateness of its policy setting.7 
This paper also suggests that the release of macroeconomic projections may be able to reduce 
the contractionary effects of the zero-lower bound constraint. The latter has been modelled as 
news about a sequence of future contractionary shocks (Campbell et al., 2012, and Campbell 
                                                          
6 This paper refers to a large literature focusing on the expectation formation process departing from the full-
information rational expectations accounting for the persistence of private expectations (sticky and noisy 
information models or adaptive learning models, and models with heterogeneity in beliefs or in loss functions) 
led by Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Bullard and Mitra (2002), Mankiw and Reis (2002), Sims (2003), Orphanides 
and Williams (2005) and Branch (2004, 2007). Another strand of the literature tries to explain macroeconomic 
outcomes with expectations (see e.g. Nunes 2010 and Adam and Padula 2011), while another strand focuses on 
the characteristics, responsiveness to news, dispersion or anchoring of expectations (see e.g. Swanson 2006, 
Capistran and Timmermann 2009, Crowe 2010, Gürkaynak et al. 2010a, Beechey et al. 2011, Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko 2012, 2015, Hubert 2014, 2015, Ehrmann 2015, Siklos 2017). 
7 The problem with the FG policy is that it may be unclear whether the central bank makes a commitment about 
policy to stimulate the economy (“Odyssean FG” in the terms of Campbell et al., 2012) or simply represents its 
views about the future outlook of the economy (“Delphic FG”). Andrade et al. (2015) and Michelacci and Paciello 
(2017) find that FG may have adverse effects if signalling a weak future expected state of the economy. 
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et al., 2016) and the publication of negative inflation surprises during this period may have 
mitigated the negative effect of these monetary shocks on private inflation expectations. 
 
The literature has focused extensively, both theoretically and empirically, on the classical 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In contrast, the signalling issue has received 
less attention, most of the analyses being theoretical in nature. Morris and Shin (2002) show 
that public signals – e.g. from a central bank – affect private agents’ actions. Angeletos et al. 
(2006) study the signalling effects of policy in coordination games. Walsh (2007) studies 
optimal transparency when the central bank provides public information by setting its policy 
instrument. In Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010), the policy instrument discloses information 
about policymakers’ assessment of shocks which are imperfectly observed by firms. Kohlhas 
(2014) shows how central bank information disclosure may increase the information content 
of public signals about the state of the economy. Tang (2015) show that policy actions can 
signal information about the macro outlook when policymakers are more informed than 
private agents. Hubert and Maule (2016) assess empirically the importance of such signalling 
channels in the UK while Melosi (2017) estimate a model in which the policy rate has 
signalling effects about the macro outlook as aggregate variables are not observed by firms.  
 
The present paper therefore bridges the signalling literature with the literature about the 
non-linear effects of monetary policy shocks. Weise (1999), Garcia (2002), Lo and Piger 
(2005), Angrist et al. (2013), Santoro et al. (2014) and Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) assess 
their state-dependence and Barnichon and Matthes (2015) also their size-dependence. This 
paper is then also linked to the finding documented by Romer and Romer (2000), Campbell 
et al. (2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2017) that contractionary United States’ federal 
fund rate surprises can have, under certain conditions, positive effects on private inflation or 
output expectations.8  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes our framework, section 3 the 
data, section 4 the first stage regressions to identify causality, and section 5 the estimates. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Framework 
 
This section sets out our approach. First, we derive predictions about how private inflation 
expectations might react to monetary shocks under different assumptions about the central 
bank’s and private agents’ information sets. Second, we present the empirical specification 
which allows us to test these predictions. 
 
2.1. Theoretical predictions 
 
First, we derive predictions for the expected effects of monetary shocks on private inflation 
expectations based on a standard macroeconomic framework with perfect information, such 
as a New-Keynesian model. In such a framework where the central bank and private agents 
have similar information sets, contractionary monetary shocks have a negative effect on 
private expectations, through the usual transmission channels. Private agents are able to 
                                                          
8 In parallel, there is an ample literature on the role of central bank communication in policymaking (see e.g. 
Woodford, 2005; Reis, 2013), its effects on inflation expectations (see e.g. Gürkaynak et al. 2005; Blinder et al., 
2008; King, Lu and Pasten, 2008), or how it may help predicting future policy decisions (see e.g. Jansen and De 
Haan, 2009; Hayo and Neuenkirch, 2010; Sturm and De Haan, 2011). 
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infer the monetary shock from the policy rule, and there is no room for a “signalling channel 
of monetary policy” and for central bank projections to modify the effect of monetary shocks. 
 
Second, we derive predictions for the expected effects of monetary shocks in a framework 
with information frictions. That assumption is consistent with empirical evidence by Coibion 
and Gorodnichenko (2015) and Andrade and Le Bihan (2013).9 In a framework with non-
nested information sets, we assume the central bank sets its interest rate it as a function of its 
own inflation, 𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵
, and output, 𝑥𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵
, projections, and potentially other macro variables, 𝜔𝑡:  
 
it = f(𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵, 𝑥𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵, 𝜔𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖            (1) 
 
where 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 is the monetary shock, capturing policymakers’ deviations from their policy rule, 
and which is orthogonal to central bank inflation and output projections. The central bank’s 
inflation and output projections depend on the central bank’s information set, 𝛺𝑡, and are 
formed prior to policy decision meetings, so do not contain the effect of the policy decision 
(i.e. they are uncorrelated with the error term 𝜀𝑡
𝑖). They are defined by: 
 
𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵  = g(𝛺𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡
𝜋𝐶𝐵  with  𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵 ┴ 𝜀𝑡
𝑖| 𝛺𝑡 
𝑥𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵  = g’(𝛺𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡
𝑥𝐶𝐵  with  𝑥𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵 ┴ 𝜀𝑡
𝑖| 𝛺𝑡           (2) 
 
It is a crucial assumption that central bank projections do not already contain the effect of the 
policy decision, so private agents can infer the monetary innovation (𝜀𝑡
𝑖) from the central 
bank reaction function (equation 1). In that set-up, when the central bank does not publish 
projections, if the observed policy rate differs from private agents’ policy expectations, 
private agents face a signal processing issue as they cannot infer whether the central bank 
has changed its own view of future inflation and output, or whether there has been a 
monetary shock. So policy decisions may convey signals about both future macroeconomic 
developments and the policy stance to private agents (see e.g. Melosi, 2017), so the response 
of private expectations would be a mix of the responses to both signals. Alternatively, when 
the central bank publishes its macroeconomic projections, private agents are able to solve 
their signal extraction issue and infer the true monetary shock, so the central bank 
projections would modify the effect policy decisions have on private expectations compared 
to the previous case.  
 
In the situation where the central bank publishes its macroeconomic projections and private 
agents are able to infer the monetary innovation, the sign of the projection surprises may also 
play a role in the response of private agents. When the central bank publishes a projection 
surprise that corroborates the monetary shock, these two pieces of information validate 
private agents’ signal extraction. Alternatively, when the central bank projection surprise 
contradicts the monetary shock, then the signal extraction remains unclear, so the policy 
decision would have less impact on private expectations. Another way of looking at this 
issue is to consider that positive (negative) inflation projection surprises would probably 
raise (lower) private agents’ expected policy rate. In this case, the contractionary effect of a 
positive monetary shock would be magnified (mitigated) by the increase (decrease) in 
private policy rate expectations. 
 
                                                          
9 In addition, recent works on information frictions such as Woodford (2001), Mankiw and Reis (2002), and Sims 
(2003) highlight how departing from the full information assumption can account for empirical patterns of 
expectations and lead to policy recommendations different from those with full information. 
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The rest of the paper aims to investigate which predictions the data appear to support by 
testing whether the publication of central bank projections and the sign of projection 
surprises modify the effects of monetary shocks, so whether central bank projections are 
used by private agents to infer the part of the interest rate change that is due to policy only.  
 
We make use of three features of the UK data to test our research question. First, we exploit 
the fact that the Bank of England publishes macroeconomic projections that are conditioned 
on the path for the policy instrument implied by financial market interest rates prior to the 
policy meeting, rather than a preferred interest rate path of the Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC).10 As these projections are not conditioned on the BoE’s policy decision, it enables us 
to separately identify projection surprises and monetary shocks. Second, policy decisions at 
the Bank of England have happened every month, whereas the Bank’s projections are 
published quarterly.11 That means that private agents do not observe up-to-date central bank 
projections for each policy decision, but only for one over three. Third, in order to nest our 
empirical analysis, we provide suggestive evidence of information rigidities for UK inflation 
expectations, as proposed in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) who regress ex-post forecast 
errors (𝜋𝑡+ℎ −  𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝑃𝐹) on forecast revisions (𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝑃𝐹 − 𝜋𝑡−1,ℎ
𝑃𝐹 ): 
 
(𝜋𝑡+ℎ − 𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝑃𝐹) = 𝛾0 +  𝛾1(𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝑃𝐹 − 𝜋𝑡−1,ℎ
𝑃𝐹 )        (3) 
 
Under the null hypothesis of existing information rigidities, we expect 𝛾1 > 0 and 𝛾1 = 0 
under full information. For 1-year ahead inflation swaps, 𝛼1 equals 0.84 and is significantly 
different from zero in months when the BoE does not publish its macroeconomic projections 
whereas it equals 0.72 and is not significant anymore in months when the BoE do publish 
them, suggesting that UK data are relevant for testing the predictions for the expected effects 
of monetary shocks in a set-up with non-nested information sets. 
 
2.2. Empirical strategy 
 
Our empirical setup is motivated by two theoretical models with rational expectations and 
information frictions. In the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Carroll 
(2003), private agents update their information set infrequently as they face costs of 
absorbing and processing information. However, if private agents update their information 
set, they gain perfect information. In the noisy information models of Woodford (2001) and 
Sims (2003), private agents continuously update their information set but observe only noisy 
signals about the true state of the economy. Their observed inertial reaction arises from the 
inability to pay attention to all the information available. Internalising their information 
processing capacity constraint, they remain inattentive to a part of the available information 
because incorporating all noisy signals is impossible (Moscarini, 2004).12  
 
We can bridge the two different strands of the literature in a simple and general specification 
by modelling private forecasts as a linear combination of past forecasts 𝜋𝑡−1,ℎ
𝑃𝐹
  and a vector 
                                                          
10 For comparison, FOMC projections are conditioned on FOMC members’ views of “appropriate monetary 
policy” which corresponds to the future interest rate path that best satisfies the Fed's dual objectives of maximum 
employment and price stability. 
11 Until September 2016, the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee held policy meetings every month, with 12 per 
year. After that point, the number of meetings has been lowered to 8 per year.  
12 Another interpretation of this reduced-form equation is that private agents have an initial belief about future 
inflation (their past inflation expectations) at the beginning of each period, and during each period, they 
incorporate relevant - but potentially noisy - information about future inflation. 
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Λt, which captures new information between t-1 and t.13 To do that, we explicitly assume 
private agents have homogeneous inflation forecasts in the case of sticky information 
models, which allows us to match the point forecasts nature of the data used hereafter:14 
 
𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝑃𝐹
  = β0 + βL 𝜋𝑡−1,ℎ
𝑃𝐹
 + βΛ Λt + εt                 (4) 
 
The value of the βL parameter, which we expect to be positive and significant, should shed 
light on whether the limited adjustment mechanism in which information is only partially 
absorbed over time is at work in the data.15 The vector Λt would include any variable that is 
likely to affect inflation and therefore to be used by private forecasters to predict future 
inflation. We decompose this vector into three subgroups. The first one includes our 
variables of interest: the monetary shock and the Bank’s inflation and output projection 
surprises. The second one, represented by the vector Xt, aims to capture news shocks and 
surprises to macro developments that are contemporaneous to central bank projections. It 
comprises a news variable capturing the set of macroeconomic data released between t-1 and 
t based on the announcement literature (see Andersen et al., 2003), the three indices of Scotti 
(2016): the real activity index, capturing the state of economic conditions, the surprise index, 
summarizing economic data surprises, and the uncertainty index, measuring uncertainty 
related to the state of the economy, as well as two high-frequency financial indices: the UK 
move and the FTSE. The third group, represented by the vector Zt, includes macroeconomic 
variables that are likely to affect inflation and so inflation expectations: Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) inflation, industrial production, oil prices, the sterling effective exchange rate, 
net lending, and housing prices. These two vectors Xt and Zt aim to capture other shocks that 
could occur at the same time than the publication of central bank projections and that would 
bias the response of private inflation expectations. Thus, equation (4) can be written as: 
 
𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝑃𝐹
  = β0 + β2 𝜀𝑡
𝑖  + β3  𝜀𝑡
𝜋𝐶𝐵 + β4 𝜀𝑡
𝑥𝐶𝐵
 + βL 𝜋𝑡−1,ℎ
𝑃𝐹
 + βX Xt + βZ Zt + εt                   (5) 
 
where 𝜀𝑡
𝑖, 𝜀𝑡
𝜋𝐶𝐵 and 𝜀𝑡
𝑥𝐶𝐵 are the monetary shock and projection surprises (from equations 1 
and 2) that we explicitly incorporate in private agents’ forecasting function.16 Equation (5) 
can then be augmented to include an interaction term of the monetary shock with either a 
dummy for the publication of central bank projections, or as represented by equation (6), the 
interaction of the monetary shock with inflation projection surprises: 
 
𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝑃𝐹
  = β0 + β1 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 ∙ 𝜀𝑡
𝜋𝐶𝐵 + β2 𝜀𝑡
𝑖  + β3 𝜀𝑡
𝜋𝐶𝐵 + β4 𝜀𝑡
𝑥𝐶𝐵
 + βL 𝜋𝑡−1,ℎ
𝑃𝐹
 + βX Xt + βZ Zt + εt       (6) 
 
After having corrected our dependent variables for term, liquidity and inflation risk premia, 
and extracted exogenous shocks from our three variables of interest to circumvent a potential 
                                                          
13 This specification can be interpreted through the lens of either noisy information models or augmented sticky-
information models where rational or professional forecasts are substituted with the vector Λt which captures 
information relevant to forecast inflation. 
14 We acknowledge that point forecasts may suffer an aggregation bias because agents may have heterogeneous 
beliefs due to differences in their own information sets, but we abstract from this issue in this paper. 
15 This specification allows us to be agnostic about whether information is imperfect or not, and about the nature 
of information frictions. We show in section 5.4 that including more lags does not alter our main results. 
16 The timing of policy decisions and Bank projection releases - detailed in the next section - which are made 
public in the early days of the given months should ensure that their information content is not already contained 
in private inflation expectations and that inflation expectation dynamics are not responsible for these shocks. We 
test the robustness of this assumption by considering only the last daily observation of each month for our left-
hand side variable so as to remove any potential endogeneity issue. 
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endogeneity issue, we estimate equation (6) with OLS.17 We do so for different horizons of 
the term structure of inflation expectations.18 Because our dependent variables are financial 
market variables that are likely to introduce heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, we 
compute heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors 
assuming that the autocorrelation dies out after three lags.19 The sign of the β1 parameter 
should shed light on the hypothesis that the effects of monetary shocks depend on central 
bank projection surprises. 
 
3. Data 
 
Our dependent variable, πPF, is derived from inflation swaps. These instruments are financial 
market contracts to transfer inflation risk from one counterparty to another. We consider 
instantaneous forwards at different maturities that measure expected inflation at the date of 
the maturity of the contract. In the UK, they are linked to the Retail Price Index (RPI) 
measure of inflation, rather than CPI, which is the measure the Bank’s inflation target is 
currently based on. In general, the advantage of financial market expectations over survey 
measures of expectations is that they are directly related to payoff decisions, so there is no 
strategic response bias or no difference between stated and actual beliefs. Although one 
disadvantage is that financial market variables do not provide a direct measure of inflation 
expectations as they are affected by term, liquidity and inflation risk premia.20 We correct 
inflation compensation, the raw measure extracted from inflation swaps, for term, liquidity 
and inflation risk premia using the regression based approach following the methodology 
used by Gürkaynak et al. (2010a, 2010b) and Soderlind (2011).This procedure is detailed the 
section A of the Appendix. 
 
Another advantage of market-based measures is that they are available for all horizons from 
1 to 10 years ahead. We perform our empirical analysis at the monthly frequency and take 
the average of all the working day observations in each month.21 For robustness purposes, 
we also consider the last observation of the month.22 These are available since October 2004, 
                                                          
17 Our econometric specification resembles the smooth transition model of Teräsvirta (1994) but abstract from 
defining a specific transition function. 
18 Estimating the equation along the term structure allows us to assess whether shocks have different effects at 
different horizons. This could happen for a number of reasons. One might relate to lags in the transmission of 
policy.  For example, the term structure could be thought of as being split into three groups: (i) the short term (i.e. 
1 year ahead), which, given the transmission lags of monetary policy, should be unaffected by changes in Bank 
Rate, (ii) the medium term (i.e. 2-4 years ahead), when interest rates are generally thought to affect the economy, 
and (iii) the long term (i.e. ≥ 5 years ahead), when the impact of any monetary shocks should have died out. 
19 This correction also enables to circumvent the “generated regressor” bias that our explanatory variables of 
interest (monetary shocks and projection surprises) might introduce in the estimation of standard errors. 
20 Swaps tend to be a better market measure for deriving inflation expectations than index-linked gilts because 
they are generally less sensitive to term and liquidity premia. 
21 Given that we are interested in the interaction of monetary shocks and projection surprises, and that policy 
decisions and projections were released on different days in a given month (the Inflation Report started to be 
published at the same time as policy decisions in August 2015 following the Warsh’s report “Transparency and 
the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee”), we cannot perform an event-study analysis at a daily 
frequency and need to work at the monthly frequency. Moreover, since we take advantage of the fact that policy 
decisions happen every month whereas projections are published quarterly, working at the monthly frequency 
does not weaken the estimation of the interaction of monetary shocks and projection surprises. Finally, because 
most of the macroeconomic variables are reported at a monthly frequency at best, we are interested in the lower-
frequency effects of monetary shocks on inflation expectations, not their daily reactions.  
22 This frequency transformation is more extreme as it discards all inflation expectation data points before the last 
observation. However, by doing so, we make sure that all shocks or information happening during a month are 
available to private agents and potentially incorporated in the last observation of the month; and (ii) that there is 
no endogeneity issue between our left-hand side variable and its potential explanatory variables. 
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which determines the starting date of our sample. For robustness purposes, we also use 
survey data from Citigroup/YouGov and the Survey of External Forecasters. 
 
Because the policy rate is at its effective lower bound during a significant part of our sample 
and monetary policy has taken many different dimensions over the last years, we use a 
shadow rate measure, labeled i, that translates unconventional policies into a single variable 
expressed in interest rate space to measure the overall stance of monetary policy. We 
consider three different measures of the BoE shadow rate. We use as a baseline a BoE 
shadow rate measure that augments Bank Rate to include a BoE in-house estimate of the 
effect of QE.23 In addition, we use for robustness purposes the shadow rate computed by Wu 
and Xia (2016) as well as the one estimated by Krippner (2013, 2014). Finally, we also use the 
BoE's policy interest rate, called Bank Rate, which is the intended policy target rate, and was 
referred previously to as the Minimum Lending Rate, Repo Rate, or Official Bank Rate.  
 
We also focus on the Bank’s inflation and output projections, πCB and xCB respectively. They 
are available from the quarterly Inflation Report (IR) for each quarter up to three years 
ahead. They are released in February, May, August and November. These forecasts are 
published with fan charts capturing the uncertainty and skewness of the forecasts.24 Two sets 
of forecasts are published: one set is conditioned on a constant interest rate path which ex-
post includes the effect of the Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) most recent Bank Rate 
decision. The other set is conditioned on the path for Bank Rate implied by market interest 
rates just prior to the previous policy meeting. A crucial assumption to ensure identification 
is that forecasts do not already contain the effect of the policy decision (in other words, they 
are uncorrelated with the monetary policy innovation 𝜀𝑡
𝑖) as if the forecasts included the 
effect of the policy change, the regression results would be biased. We therefore use the latter 
set of forecasts.  
 
For the identification of monetary shocks and projection surprises, we also use private 
output expectations obtained from Consensus Forecasts for horizons from 1 to 6 quarters 
ahead (monthly constant-interpolated from surveys in March, June, September and 
December) and from the Bank’s Survey of External Forecasters for horizons from 2 to 3 years 
ahead (monthly constant-interpolated from surveys in February, May, August and 
November); and 3-month market interest rate expectations 1 to 3 years ahead. This market 
interest rate curve is the one used as conditioning path for BoE’s macroeconomic projections. 
 
The vector Xt includes a news variable πs which represents inflation surprises: the 
information set of macroeconomic data released between t-1 and t having an impact on the 
inflation outcome. Following the announcement and news literature (Andersen et al., 2003, 
and references within), this variable is defined as the difference between the actual value of 
CPI inflation in t and the private inflation forecast, measured by the Bloomberg Consensus, 
formed at date t-1 for the quarter t (πs = πt – Et-1πt). This is equivalent to the private inflation 
forecast error and captures the news published between the two dates. Bloomberg provides 
the market average expected one month ahead CPI inflation outturn at a monthly frequency. 
                                                          
23 The shadow rate is derived by computing a sequence of unanticipated monetary policy shocks to match the 
time series for the estimated effect of QE on GDP using estimates from Joyce, Tong and Woods (2011) – see also 
Section 8.4 of Burgess et al. (2013). The underlying assumption that underpins this approach is that QE is a close 
substitute as a monetary policy instrument to Bank Rate such that the zero lower bound was not an effective 
constraint on monetary policy over the period in question. 
24 Analyzing whether the uncertainty and skewness matter for the responses of inflation expectations is beyond 
the scope of this paper and left for future research. Moreover, our intuition is that it should not matter that much 
as the variance of these measures is extremely small.  
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We also capture the presence of news by using the three indices (real activity, surprise and 
uncertainty) estimated by Scotti (2016) for the UK, and two financial indices, the UK move 
and FTSE, that are supposed to react in real-time and promptly to information flows. 
 
The vector Zt comprises various macroeconomic controls that are likely to capture expected 
inflation dynamics: CPI inflation, industrial production, oil prices, net lending, the sterling 
ERI, and housing prices (all included as 12-month percentage changes). Our overall sample 
period is 2004m10-2015m03. Data sources and descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 
A1 and A2 in the Appendix.  
 
4. Identification of Monetary Shocks and Projection Surprises 
 
When estimating the effects of monetary policy and central bank inflation and output 
projections, we need to overcome one major econometric challenge. Our three variables of 
interest are likely to be endogenous to private inflation expectations. To correct for this, we 
perform a first-stage regression to isolate the unpredictable and exogenous innovations to i, 
πCB, and xCB, orthogonal to their systematic component. So the contribution of the 
endogenous factors that underlies the evolution of these three variables would be removed.25 
 
Blanchard et al. (2013) and Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2017) have shown how 
information frictions modify the econometric identification problem. In order to cope with 
the presence of non-nested information sets, we augment Romer and Romer (2004)’s 
approach so that exogenous innovations are not only orthogonal to the central bank’s 
information set but also to private agents’ information set. We aim to remove the 
contribution of lagged macroeconomic variables and private forecasts (so that innovations can 
have contemporaneous effects on these) and the contribution of contemporaneous Bank 
variables (so as to remove the information set of policymakers).  
 
4.1. Monetary shocks 
 
Starting with the identification of monetary shocks from a shadow rate measure it and based 
on equation (1), we estimate the following equation: 
 
∆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼2,ℎ 𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵3
ℎ=1 + ∑ 𝛼3,ℎ  𝑥𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵3
ℎ=1    
+ ∑ 𝛼4,ℎ ∆𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵3
ℎ=1 +  ∑ 𝛼5,ℎ ∆𝑥𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵3
ℎ=1 + 𝛼6 𝛹𝑡−1 + 𝛼7 𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖              (7) 
 
We assume that changes in it are driven by the policymakers’ response to the level and 
change in its own inflation (𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵and ∆𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵) and output (𝑥𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵 and ∆𝑥𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵) projections at horizons 
h = 1, 2 and 3 years ahead, to a vector Ψt-1 which includes lagged private inflation and output 
expectations and lagged macro variables (the vector Zt comprising CPI, industrial 
production, oil prices, sterling effective exchange rate, net lending, and housing prices), and 
to a dummy IRt that takes the value 1 in months when the BoE publishes its Inflation Report 
(IR). f(∙) is the function capturing its systematic reaction and the error term 𝜀𝑡
𝑖  reflects 
monetary shocks. More precisely, private inflation and output expectations are introduced in 
equation (7) through the first principal components (from a Principal Component Analysis, 
                                                          
25 The main advantage of this approach over a VAR estimation is that the identification of innovations does not 
rely on short-run timing restrictions in a recursive set-up, while only one restriction is needed (and justifiable): 
projections are not a function of the policy rate and cannot react contemporaneously to it whereas the opposite is 
true. Moreover, estimating a VAR might also raise the issue of the number of degrees of freedom. Because there is 
no obvious instrument for these variables, an instrumental variable strategy does not appear relevant.  
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PCA) of six private inflation expectation series from 1 to 10 years ahead, and five private 
output expectation series from 1-quarter to 2 years ahead.26  
 
The inclusion of both private and central bank forecasts in the regression model enables us to 
deal with three concerns. First, forecasts encompass rich information sets. Private agents and 
policymakers’ information sets include a large number of variables. Bernanke et al. (2005) 
show that a data-rich environment approach modifies the identification of monetary shocks. 
Forecasts work as a FAVAR model as they summarise a large variety of macroeconomic 
variables as well as their expected evolutions. Second, forecasts are real-time data. Private 
agents and policymakers base their decisions on their information set in real-time, not on ex-
post revised data. Orphanides (2001, 2003) show that Taylor (1993) rule-type reaction 
functions estimated on revised data produce different outcomes when using real-time data. 
Third, private agents and policymakers are mechanically incorporating information about 
the current state of the economy and anticipate future macroeconomic conditions in their 
forecasts and we need to correct for their forward-looking information set when estimating 
the exogenous part of their respective forecasts. 
 
We assess the robustness of this method for estimating exogenous monetary shocks in 
various ways. First, we estimate monetary shocks with two alternative shadow rate 
measures: the ones estimated by Wu and Xia (2016) and Krippner (2013, 2014). Second, 
because private agents may expect the central bank to update its policy more frequently 
during IR months when it updates its published assessment of the current and future state of 
the economy, expectations of policy changes may be different in IR and non-IR months.27 We 
therefore estimate equation (7) on IR months only but extract residuals for all months. We 
also proceed to two estimations for IR and non-IR months and extract series of residuals for 
each that we combine in a unique time series. Third, because the period during which the 
policy rate approaches the ZLB may affect macroeconomic dynamics, the transmission of 
macroeconomic shocks and the way private agents form their expectations, we estimate 
equation (7) on two subsamples pre and post ZLB. The former estimation features the Bank 
Rate while the latter features the shadow rate. Fourth, we estimate a forward-looking Taylor 
rule with one lag of interest rate smoothing and the 1 year, 2 years and 3 years ahead 
inflation and output projections. Fifth, we reproduce the monetary shock measure of Cloyne 
and Huertgen (2016).28 Sixth, we replace the first principal components of private inflation 
and output expectations in the vector Ψt-1 by all individual series of private inflation and 
output expectations at different horizons. 
 
The correlation of the baseline monetary shock series is 0.16 with the one using the shadow 
rate of Wu and Xia (2016), 0.22 with the one of Krippner (2013, 2014), 0.89 with the series 
obtained from the estimation on IR months only, 0.97 with the series from two estimations 
                                                          
26 We use the first principal component of a given forecast variable at various horizons so as not to include all 
horizons into the estimated model and then avoid multicollinearity or losing too many degrees of freedom. The 
first principal component intends to capture the forward-looking information set of forecasters for all horizons 
together. The first principal component of private inflation expectations captures 76% of the variance of the 
underlying series, while the first principal component of private output forecasts captures 85% of variance. For 
robustness purposes, we provide estimates when not using the first principal components but all forecast series.  
27 While Bean and Jenkinson (2001) report that the BoE is more likely to change interest rates in Inflation Report 
months, our sample includes 7 interest rate changes in IR months and 8 changes in non-IR months. 
28 Cloyne and Huertgen (2016) regresses the change in Bank Rate on the level of past Bank Rate (together with the 
Bank’s projections and macro variables; equation (2) in their paper), and then cumulates the series of residuals to 
obtain their monetary shock series. Their series stops in 2007 just before Bank Rate converged towards the 
effective lower bound. Using their methodology and the Bank of England’s shadow rate, we compute an 
equivalent to their monetary shock series. 
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for IR and non-IR months, 0.45 with the series estimated from two subsamples pre and post 
ZLB, 0.81 with the series from a Taylor rule, 0.17 with the series from Cloyne and Huertgen 
(2016), and 0.80 with the series without the first principal components. We present in section 
5.4 estimates of our coefficient of interest using these alternative monetary shock series. 
 
4.2. Central bank projection surprises 
 
Central bank inflation and output projection surprises should be seen as the unpredictable 
component of these projections, conditional on the information available to private agents at 
the date when the projections are published. We estimate these surprises by using the Bank’s 
inflation and output projections conditioned on the path for Bank Rate implied by market 
interest rates prior to the policy meeting, so independent from the policy decision, using the 
following equation (for inflation projections, as an example): 
 
 𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵 =  𝜙0 + 𝜙1 𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙2,ℎ 𝜋𝑡−1,ℎ
𝐶𝐵3
ℎ=1 + ∑ 𝜙3,ℎ 𝑥𝑡−1,ℎ
𝐶𝐵3
ℎ=1 +  𝜙4 𝑚𝑐𝑡,ℎ + 𝜙5 𝛹𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝜋𝐶𝐵   (8) 
 
where the level of lagged inflation (𝜋𝑡−1,ℎ
𝐶𝐵 ) and output (𝑥𝑡−1,ℎ
𝐶𝐵 ) projections at horizons h = 1, 2 
and 3 years ahead is included, mct,h is the market interest rate curve used as conditioning 
path for BoE’s macroeconomic projections at horizons h = 1, 2 and 3 years ahead, the vector 
Ψt-1 includes a lag of the first principal components of private inflation and output 
expectations and a lag of the vector Z of macro variables. Equation (8) is estimated on IR 
months only since no projections are published during non-IR months (during which, by 
construction, projection surprises are zero). Figure 1 plots the estimated monetary shocks 
and projection surprises, while Table A4 shows the estimated parameters of equations (7)-(8), 
and the properties and correlation of exogenous innovations.  
 
Because the Bank’s inflation and output projections are published quarterly, the estimation 
of equation (8) for these two variables is performed for the specific months when the Bank’s 
projections are released but without affecting the lag structure (for instance, the surprise to 
February projections takes January values for the lagged macro variables). The estimated 
surprises therefore have non-zero values during the months when the Bank’s projections are 
published and zeros otherwise, which is consistent with the fact that no re-assessment or 
releases of the Bank’s projections happen during these months. A potential alternative would 
be to proceed to a constant-interpolation of the Bank projection surprises for the following 
two months during each quarter to fill these gaps as one could argue that the projections are 
still available during the following two months. We choose to focus on the most conservative 
choice and keep all zeros for the months with no Inflation Report.  
 
It is worth stressing that the timing of the variables in equations (7)-(8) is driven by the 
assumption that monetary shocks and projection surprises can affect macro and financial 
variables and private expectations contemporaneously (so these variables enter with a lag in 
equations 7-8). Monetary shocks being orthogonal to the policymakers’ information set, 
central bank projections enter contemporaneously in equation (7), whereas the formation of 
projections preceding the policy decision, the shadow rate enters with a lag in equation (8).  
 
Finally, if these estimated series of exogenous innovations are relevant, they should be 
unpredictable from movements in data. So we assess the predictability of the estimated 
innovation series with Granger-causality type tests and regress these series on a set of 
variables from a standard macro VAR including inflation, industrial production, oil prices, 
the sterling effective exchange rate and net lending growth. The bottom panel of Table A4 in 
the Appendix shows the F-stats of this test. The null hypothesis that these estimated series of 
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exogenous innovations are unpredictable cannot be rejected and that they are relevant to be 
used in second stage estimations to assess their effects on private inflation expectations. 
 
5. The Non-Linear Effects of Monetary Shocks 
 
We now investigate whether private agents process monetary shocks differently when they 
receive central bank information. Given that facilitating private agents’ information 
processing is one reason why central banks complement their actions with communication to 
the public (see Adam, 2009, or Baeriswyl and Cornand, 2010), we test that the effects of 
monetary shocks vary when central bank macroeconomic projections are published at the 
same time. 
 
5.1. The effect of monetary shocks in IR and non-IR months 
 
We first test the hypothesis that the publication of central bank projections, not their content, 
modifies private agents’ interpretation of policy decisions, so the effects of monetary shocks. 
Indeed, the monetary shock series is reported at a monthly frequency, whereas surprises to 
the Bank’s projections can happen only in months in which the quarterly IR is published. In 
the months in which projections are published, the impact of monetary shocks might be 
different because private agents are provided with more information.  
 
Table 1 shows, for 1 to 10 years ahead inflation expectations, estimates of an alternative 
equation (6) in which monetary shocks are interacted with a dummy for the publication of 
Bank’s projections, and the two BoE’s inflation and output projection variables are replaced 
by this publication dummy. In months when no central bank information is published, 
contractionary monetary shocks have a significant negative effect on inflation expectations at 
the 1-year horizon only. More precisely, a 1 S.D. increase in the shadow rate would decrease 
inflation expectations by 0.08 percentage points. This negative response of private inflation 
expectations to contractionary monetary shocks is consistent with the usual transmission 
mechanism. Although the difference (the interaction term) is not significant at conventional 
levels, in months when the BoE publishes its IR and macroeconomic projections, 
contractionary monetary shocks have a more negative effect on inflation expectations at the 
1-year horizon (-0.11 percentage points) and have a significant negative effect on inflation 
expectations from 2 years to 5 years ahead. In addition, we find that monetary shocks during 
non-IR months account for 8% of the variance of 1-year ahead inflation expectations whereas 
they account for 10% at the same horizon during IR months.29 Finally, the magnitude of the 
effect of monetary shocks during IR months decreases with the horizon, consistent with 
waning effects of monetary policy on inflation. The transmission lags of monetary policy are 
often estimated to be around 12 to 24 months for inflation (see e.g. Bernanke and Blinder, 
1992, or Bernanke and Mihov, 1998). Negative effects at longer horizons than the 
transmission lags could be interpreted as a signalling effect going through the expectations 
channel. 
 
This finding suggests that the information conveyed when the BoE publishes its IR and 
macroeconomic projections modifies private agents’ interpretation of the policy decision, 
and so the effects of monetary shocks. However, this result is not a sufficient condition to 
demonstrate that the publication of central bank macroeconomic information affects the 
transmission of monetary shocks. Indeed, the effect evidenced here might be due to the 
                                                          
29 We compute this variance decomposition using partial R² that indicates the fraction of the improvement in R² 
that is contributed by the excluded covariate. 
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disclosure of information about policymakers’ preferences or guidance about the future 
likely stance of policy rather than about policymakers’ macroeconomic information set. 
 
5.2. The interaction of monetary shocks and projection surprises 
 
We second test the hypothesis that the central bank projections per se (their information 
content) modifies private agents’ inference of the part of interest rate changes that is due to 
policy specifically (i.e. the ability of private agents to uncover the pure monetary 
innovation), so the effect of monetary shocks. We then assess whether monetary shocks are 
given a different interpretation by private agents depending on Bank’s projection surprises. 
We might expect that, when there is a positive projection shock, the negative effect of a 
contractionary monetary shock is amplified, because both the policy decision and the 
macroeconomic surprise are consistent and the effect of the monetary innovation can be 
inferred in a Taylor-type rule setting, so can be the effect on future inflation. At the opposite, 
we might expect a contractionary monetary shock to have a more muted effect when 
accompanied by a negative inflation projection surprise, since the policy decision and the 
macroeconomic surprise are not consistent, so the monetary shock cannot be inferred and so 
is less effective. 
 
Our baseline analysis is realised for BoE’s inflation projections 1 year ahead. This horizon 
falls before interest rates are generally estimated to have their peak effect on inflation - 
around 18 months ahead - and therefore enables us to minimise the control issue,30  but 
should also convey information about inflation at the 1 year horizon, the shortest horizon of 
the term structure of private inflation expectations studied here.  
 
We are primarily interested in the sign of the parameter (β1) associated with the interaction 
variable that enables rejecting or not our null hypothesis. Table 2 shows, for 1 to 10 years 
ahead inflation expectations, estimates of equation (6) in which monetary shocks are 
interacted with BoE’s inflation projection surprises.31 The main result is that the coefficient of 
the interaction variable is significant and negative for the 1 to 5 years horizon inflation 
expectations. This means that the negative effect of contractionary monetary shocks is 
amplified when policymakers’ surprise private agents with higher inflation projections than 
expected whereas contractionary monetary shocks have no impact on inflation expectations 
when interacted with a negative surprise to the BoE’s inflation projections. More precisely, a 
1 S.D. increase in the shadow rate reduces inflation expectations by 0.18 percentage points at 
the 1-year horizon when accompanied by positive projection surprises, but does not impact 
inflation expectations when accompanied by negative projection surprises. The monetary 
shock alone (i.e. independently of BoE’s inflation projection surprises) has a significant 
negative effect on inflation expectations at the 1 and 2 years horizons (-0.09 and -0.05 
percentage points respectively). We find that monetary shocks alone account for 10% of the 
variance of 1-year ahead inflation expectations while monetary shocks interacted with 
projection surprises account for 13% at the same horizon. 
 
This finding suggests that central bank projections give private agents the possibility to infer 
the pure monetary innovation and therefore determinate its effects on private inflation 
expectations. Thus, when contractionary monetary shocks are not corroborated by a positive 
surprise to the Bank’s inflation projections, the inference of the pure monetary innovation is 
                                                          
30 The interest rate instrument gives the central bank some control over the forecasted variables, and this issue is 
circumvented when the horizon of forecasts is shorter than the transmission lag of monetary policy. 
31 The results show that βL is positive and significant, consistent with inertia in inflation expectations, suggesting 
that the information frictions framework is likely to be appropriate for this analysis. 
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made more difficult so the negative effect of monetary shocks is smaller; while when 
contractionary monetary shocks are contradicted by a negative surprise to the Bank’s 
inflation projections, the inference of the pure monetary innovation is problematic so the 
effect of monetary shocks vanishes. This result therefore suggests that providing guidance 
about future projections of inflation rather than future projections of interest rates – the 
Forward Guidance policy – may actually enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy by 
better allowing private agents to distinguish between the information set of the central bank 
and the appropriateness of its policy setting.   
 
It is worth stressing that central bank projection surprises itself, in this set-up accounting for 
non-linearities, do not impact private inflation expectations, at least at conventional 
significance levels. The value added of central bank projections goes through their 
contribution to the inference of monetary shocks. This finding is consistent with Hubert and 
Maule (2016). They find in a linear set-up that central bank projections may convey policy 
signals as policy decisions may convey macro signals. An increase in central bank inflation 
projections could signal that an inflationary shock will hit the economy in the future, causing 
higher inflation; alternatively, a similar increase in central bank inflation projections may be 
interpreted as a signal about a future policy tightening, leading to lower expected inflation. 
 
Table A5 in the Appendix shows estimates of specifications of equation (6) with 2-years 
ahead BoE’s projections and BoE’s output projections. The monetary shocks alone always 
have a negative effect on 1 and 2 years ahead inflation expectations. However, the interaction 
is never significant. First, it seems that private forecasters better understand the link between 
the policy instrument and inflation than with output, which is consistent with a central bank 
pursing an inflation targeting strategy, like the Bank of England. Second, it seems that only 
inflation projection surprises at the 1-year horizon matters. A potential reason for such an 
effect may be that the central bank tends to publish inflation projections that converge to its 
inflation target around the 2 years horizon (and even more so at the policy horizon, i.e. 3 
years), so the information content of these is smaller.32 Private agents would therefore use 
inflation projections at the 1-year to understand the policymakers’ information set and 
uncover the pure monetary innovation.  
 
The non-linearity evidenced above should not be confused with a non-linear effect of 
monetary policy with the business cycle. Evidence on this matter is mixed so far. On the one 
hand, Barnichon and Matthes (2016), for instance, find that monetary policy is more potent 
during recessions. So if one assumes that positive (resp. negative) inflation projection 
surprises are a proxy for a future positive (resp. negative) output gap, then the effect we find 
(a muted effect of monetary shocks when interacted with negative inflation projection 
surprises) is the opposite of theirs. On the other hand, Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016), for 
instance, find that monetary policy is less powerful during recessions. Under the same 
assumption about what projection surprises may capture, one may conclude that the more 
negative effect of monetary shocks with positive inflation projection surprises captures the 
more negative effect of monetary policy on inflation during expansions. However, the 
assumption underlying this argument is not consistent with the data: the correlation between 
inflation projection surprises and a contemporaneous (resp. 1-year forward) output gap 
measure (the Hodrick-Prescott trend/cycle decomposition of real GDP growth) is 0.04 (resp. 
-0.02) and non-significant. This suggests that the non-linear effect of monetary policy 
evidenced in this paper is specific to central bank projections. 
                                                          
32 Table A2 in the Appendix shows the distribution of the absolute value of deviation of inflation projections to 
the inflation target. It shows that the mode is much smaller for the 2-year horizon than for the 1-year horizon. 
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Finally, Table 3 shows estimates pre and post ZLB of the non-linear effects of monetary 
shocks when interacted with inflation projection surprises. The interaction variable is 
negative on the post-ZLB subsample but less than in the pre-ZLB subsample. So the negative 
effect of monetary shocks when interacted with positive inflation surprises is weaker than in 
the pre-ZLB subsample. This difference suggests that the release of macroeconomic 
projections may have been able to reduce the contractionary effects of the zero-lower bound 
constraint. The latter has been modelled as news about a sequence of future contractionary 
shocks (Campbell et al., 2012, and Campbell et al., 2016) and the publication of inflation 
surprises during this period may have mitigated the negative effect of these monetary shocks 
on private inflation expectations. 
 
5.3. Local projections 
 
This section investigates the dynamic effects of monetary shocks and assesses how persistent 
is the contemporaneous effect evidenced in section 6.2. Our preferred approach is to use the 
local projections method of Jordà (2005). Impulse response functions obtained from VARs 
may be imposing excessive restrictions on the endogenous dynamics, while the local 
projection method is more flexible and may easily account for non-linearities in the 
transmission of monetary policy. Another advantage is the robustness of local projections to 
model misspecification to estimate dynamic responses to exogenous shocks.33 
 
Jordà (2005) suggests estimating a set of k regressions representing the impulse response of 
the dependent variable at the horizon k to a given exogenous shock at time t. We therefore 
modify equation (6) in that respect: 
 
𝜋𝑡+𝑘,ℎ
𝑃𝐹
 = β0,k + β1,k 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 ∙ 𝜀𝑡
𝜋𝐶𝐵 + β2,k  𝜀𝑡
𝑖 + β3,k  𝜀𝑡
𝜋𝐶𝐵 
+ β4,k 𝜀𝑡
𝑥𝐶𝐵+ βL,k 𝜋𝑡−1,ℎ
𝑃𝐹
 + βX,k Xt + βZ,k Zt + εt+k              (9) 
 
where 𝜋𝑡+𝑘,ℎ
𝑃𝐹  is our dependent variable, private inflation expectations h-year ahead, at the 
horizon k, 𝜀𝑡
𝑖  is the monetary shock, 𝜀𝑡
𝜋𝐶𝐵  is the BoE’s inflation projection surprise, and 
𝜀𝑡
𝑖 ∙ 𝜀𝑡
𝜋𝐶𝐵 is the interaction of both. Xt and Zt are vectors of news and macroeconomic controls 
respectively. Equation (9) is estimated with OLS until k = 6.  
 
Figure 2 plots the results from estimating the dynamic effects, over 6 months, of monetary 
shocks when interacted with positive and negative inflation projection surprises on private 
inflation expectations from 1 to 10 years ahead. Each panel plots the 𝛽1,k coefficient for each 
of the 6 horizons. Monetary shocks have statistically different effects on inflation 
expectations depending on whether they corroborated or contradicted by inflation projection 
surprises at least during 2 months after the policy decision. This is true for inflation 
expectations 1 to 5 years ahead.  
 
It is interesting to note that the response of inflation expectations, from 1 to 5 years ahead, to 
a contractionary monetary shock interacted with a negative inflation projection surprise is 
not only different from the response with a positive inflation projection surprise, but is also 
positive and significantly different from zero after 2 months. This finding is consistent with 
one of the results of Melosi (2017) which finds that inflation expectations may respond 
positively to contractionary monetary shocks under certain calibrated parameters. When the 
                                                          
33 Another alternative is to estimate the effect of monetary shocks in a simple autoregressive distributed lag 
(ADL) model. One potential drawback of this approach for our specification is the differencing of the dependent 
variable over the long run. 
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quality of private information is poor relative to that of central bank information (private 
agents’ signal-to-noise ratio is low), and/or if the policy rate is more informative about non-
monetary shocks than about monetary shocks (the variance of monetary shocks is low or the 
central bank’s estimates of inflation and the output gap are relatively accurate), then the 
macro outlook signalling channel may be at work. Similarly, Tang (2015) finds a positive 
effect when prior uncertainty about inflation is high.  
 
It is also worth stressing that the non-linear effect is not reversed afterwards: responses to 
monetary shocks are not statistically different 3 or 4 months after the policy decisions, so the 
difference in the cumulated effects of the initial impact and of the first two months is not 
offset. These dynamic estimates show that the differentiated effects of monetary shocks when 
interacted with projection surprises are persistent and tend to suggest that the disclosure of 
central bank macroeconomic information and helping private agents to infer monetary 
innovations has tangible effects. 
 
5.4. Sensitivity analysis 
 
We run several tests to ensure the robustness of the baseline non-linear results. They are 
decomposed into tests about the identification of monetary shocks and projection surprises, 
the left-hand side variable, additional right-hand side variables and subsample estimates.  
 
The robustness tests about the identification of monetary shocks are presented in the 
subsection 4.1. Monetary shocks are estimated with two alternative shadow rate measures. 
Parameters of equation (7) are estimated on IR months only but residuals extracted for all 
months, or using two distinct estimations for IR and non-IR months. Equation (7) is 
estimated on two subsamples pre and post ZLB. A forward-looking Taylor rule is estimated 
and the monetary shock measure of Cloyne and Huertgen (2016) is reproduced. The first 
principal components of private inflation and output expectations in the vector Ψt-1 in 
equation (7) is replaced by all individual series of private inflation and output expectations at 
all different horizons. The differentiated effects of large and small monetary shocks are 
estimated. Tables A6 and A7 in the Appendix show that the marginal effect of inflation 
projection surprises on the impact of monetary shocks is always negative. 
 
Turning to private inflation expectation measures, we first consider a more extreme 
information assumption, replacing the monthly average of all observations of market-based 
(daily) inflation expectations by the last observation of the month. While we discard all 
inflation expectation data points before the last observation by doing so, we ensure that: (i) 
all shocks or information happening during a month are available to private agents and 
potentially incorporated in the last observation of the month; and (ii) that there is no 
endogeneity issue between our left-hand side variable and its potential explanatory 
variables. Second, we replace the swap-based inflation expectation measures by the break-
even inflation rates obtained from the difference between inflation-indexed and nominal 
gilts. Because of liquidity issues on short maturities, inflation-indexed bonds are only 
considered from the 4-years horizon. Third, we replace the level of inflation expectations by 
their first difference. Fourth, we replace the level of private expectations by their deviation 
from the Bank’s inflation target (corrected for the sample mean of the wedge between RPI 
and CPI).34  
                                                          
34 The wedge is computed as the difference between RPI and CPI inflation corrected for the contribution of a 
dummy capturing the uncertainty created by the announcement by the Office for National Statistics’ Consumer 
Prices Advisory Committee (CPAC) of a potential revision in the RPI calculation methodology, between May 
2012 and January 2013.  
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Fifth, we correct inflation compensation measures for term, liquidity, inflation risk premia by 
estimating equation (A2) in the Appendix on the full sample, therefore assuming a constant 
pricing of these premia. By doing so, we assess the impact of the assumption that the ZLB 
may affect the transmission of shocks and macro and financial dynamics, so that the pricing 
relationship of premia may change pre and post ZLB. Sixth, because the proxies we use to 
correct inflation compensation for the different premia might be correlated with the business 
cycle, we turn to an alternative methodology using survey expectation measures that do not 
contain these various premia. We regress market-based expectations on survey expectations 
and consider the predicted value as our left-hand side variables. Seventh, because the central 
bank may intend to affect the inflation risk premium as well as inflation expectations, we 
also compute adjusted series for term and liquidity premia only. Eighth, we use raw inflation 
compensation rather than our derived inflation expectation measure, so as to assess the 
impact of the correction for term, liquidity, and inflation risk premia. Tables A8 and A9 in 
the Appendix show that the non-linear effect of monetary shocks when interacted with 
inflation projection surprises does not depend on the variables or corrections used to 
measure private inflation expectations.35 
 
We then assess the impact of estimating the non-linear effects on two different subsamples 
ending in March 2009, when Bank Rate reached its lower bound, and in July 2013, when the 
forward guidance policy was introduced. We therefore check that our results are robust to 
sub-samples when Bank Rate was considered the main policy instrument and when the 
central bank did not disclose information about the future likely path of policy. We also use a 
constant-interpolated measure of the projection surprises, so during the two months after the 
publication of the Inflation Report, they take the value of the surprise happening in the first 
month instead of zeros. In addition, we use a constant-interpolated measure of the 
projections, so during the two months after the publication of the Inflation Report, they take 
the value of the projections published and we estimate equation (8) on all dates. We finally 
assess whether the non-linear result holds when considering raw inflation projections rather 
than inflation projection surprises, so the main result is not driven by our identification of 
these surprises. Table A10 in the Appendix confirms the negative coefficient of the 
interaction term between monetary shocks and inflation projection surprises.36 
 
In addition, we assess the robustness of the non-linear effect to additional right-hand side 
variables. First, we estimate equation (6) without the vectors Xt and Zt to examine potential 
over-identification issues and further check the orthogonality condition of our estimated 
shocks and surprises. Second, we estimate equation (6) without output projection surprises, 
so as to control that the non-linear effects do not depend on their inclusion together with 
inflation projection surprises.37  We augment the vector of macro controls with a Value 
Added Tax (VAT) dummy which takes the value of one in December 2008, January 2010 and 
January 2011 when the UK government raised the VAT causing inflation to rise. Then we test 
a specification in which we introduce a dummy for the dates of the announcements of 
explicit forward guidance on future policy rates in August 2013 and February 2014.38 Table 
                                                          
35 We also performed quantile regressions to assess whether estimates approximating the conditional mean of the 
dependent variable were similar across its entire distribution. Estimates of the conditional median or of other 
quantiles are similar to the OLS estimates. These outcomes are available from the authors upon request. 
36 It is interesting to note that the effect of inflation projection surprises on monetary shocks is sometimes reversed 
and positive on very long-term inflation expectations (at the 10-years horizon) suggesting that a different 
interpretation is given to the same policy decision depending on the horizon. However, the lack of range of this 
effect does not enable drawing sound conclusions about it. 
37 As the BoE is an inflation targeting central bank, one could argue that only inflation projections should matter. 
38 The Monetary Policy Committee has provided guidance on the setting of future monetary policy since 7 August 
2013. For details, see http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/forwardguidance.aspx. Because 
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A11 in the Appendix shows that the non-linear effect evidenced does not stem from an 
omitted variable bias and inflation projection surprises capturing the presence of news. 
 
Finally, because news shock at time t may raise private inflation expectations as well as 
central bank inflation projections, the estimation requires controlling for as many news 
shocks as possible. In our benchmark analysis, we control for a news variable à la Andersen 
et al. (2003), the real activity, surprise and uncertainty indices of Scotti (2016) and two high-
frequency financial indices: the UK move and the FTSE. To further control that central bank 
projections do not capture the presence of potential news shocks, we augment the Xt with the 
three European Commission (EC)’s UK sentiment measures for the industry, services and 
consumers. We also include the change between t-1 and t in private output and interest rate 
forecasts, to control for their link with private inflation forecasts as evidenced by Fendel et al. 
(2011), Dräger et al. (2016) and Paloviita and Viren (2013).39 That allows us to control for the 
changes in private inflation expectations which are related to changes in private beliefs about 
other macro variables. We also test a specification in which we include various other 
macroeconomic, financial and expectation variables to further control that our result is not 
driven by some omitted variable bias.  We add to equation (6) the growth rate of retail prices, 
input producer prices, output producer prices, wages, import prices, the level of 
unemployment, capacity constraints, capacity utilisation, the cycle component of an HP filter 
of real GDP, the change in the VIX and the Saint-Louis Financial Stress Index, and private 
output expectations at the 2 and 3-years horizon. Finally, we include five more lags of the 
dependent variable (so up to 6 lags) in equation (6). Table A12 in the Appendix shows that 
the non-linear effect evidenced does not stem from the omission of variables enabling private 
agents to forecast future inflation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates the extent to which the effects of monetary shocks on inflation 
expectations depend on the macroeconomic information released by the central bank. We 
assess the non-linear effects of monetary shocks conditional on the Bank of England’s 
macroeconomic projections on UK private inflation expectations. After having corrected our 
dependent variables, UK market-based inflation expectation measures, for term, liquidity 
and inflation risk premia, and extracted exogenous innovations following Romer and Romer 
(2004)’s identification approach, we estimate the interacted effects of these innovations in an 
empirical framework derived from the information frictions literature. We find that private 
inflation expectations respond negatively to contractionary monetary shocks, as would be 
expected given the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. However, we also find that 
inflation projections modify the impact of monetary shocks. When contractionary monetary 
shocks are corroborated by positive projections, the negative effect of policy on inflation 
expectations is amplified. Whereas when contractionary monetary shocks are contradicted 
by negative projections, the negative effect of policy on inflation expectations is reduced. 
This suggests that providing guidance about central bank future expected inflation helps 
private agents’ information processing, and therefore changes their response to policy 
decisions. The coordination of policy decisions and macroeconomic projections appears 
important for the management of private inflation expectations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
this policy is supposed to affect the private agents’ expected future policy path via a commitment device, it may 
affect private inflation expectations, and we need to control for this potential effect at the end of our sample.  
39 We use Consensus Forecasts and the market curve used by the BoE as conditioning path for its projections for 
private output and interest rate expectations. 
21 
 
References 
 
Adam, Klaus (2009). “Monetary policy and aggregate volatility”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 56, S1–S18. 
Adam, Klaus, and Mario Padula (2011). “Inflation Dynamics and Subjective Expectations in 
the United States”, Economic Inquiry, 49(1), 13–25. 
Andersen, Torben, Tim Bollerslev, Francis Diebold, and Clara Vega (2003). “Micro Effects of 
Macro Announcements: Real-Time Price Discovery in Foreign Exchange.” American 
Economic Review, 93(1), 38-62. 
Andrade, Philippe, Gaballo Gaetano, Eric Mengus and Benoit Mojon (2015). “Forward 
Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs”, Banque de France Working Paper, No. 573. 
Andrade, Philippe, and Hervé Le Bihan (2013). “Inattentive professional forecasters”, Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 60(8), 967-982. 
Angeletos, George-Marios, Christian Hellwig, and Alessandro Pavan (2006). “Signaling in a 
Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps”, Journal of Political Economy, 114, 452–484. 
Angrist, Joshua, Òscar Jordà and Guido Kuersteiner (2013). “Semiparametric estimates of 
monetary policy effects: string theory revisited”, NBER Working Paper, No. 19355. 
Baeriswyl, Romain, and Camille Cornand (2010). “The signaling role of policy actions”, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 57(6), 682–695. 
Barnichon, Regis, and Christian Matthes (2015). “Measuring the Non-Linear Effects of 
Monetary Policy”, mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. 
Bean, Charles, and Nigel Jenkinson (2001). “The formulation of monetary policy at the Bank 
of England”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Winter. 
Beechey, Meredith, Benjamin Johannsen, and Andrew Levin (2011). “Are long-run inflation 
expectations anchored more firmly in the Euro area than in the United States?”, 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3(2), 104-129. 
Bernanke, Ben, and Alan Blinder (1992). “The Federal Funds Rate and the channels of 
monetary transmission”, American Economic Review, 82(4), 901–921. 
Bernanke, Ben, and Ilian Mihov (1998). “Measuring monetary policy”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 113(3), 869–902. 
Bernanke, Ben, Jean Boivin, and Piotr Eliasz (2005). “Measuring the Effects of Monetary 
Policy: A Factor-augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) Approach”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 120(1), 387–422. 
Blanchard, Olivier, Jean-Paul L’Huillier, and Guido Lorenzoni (2013). “News, Noise, and 
Fluctuations: An Empirical Exploration,” American Economic Review, 103(7), 3045–70. 
Blinder, Alan, Michael Ehrmann, Marcel Fratzscher, Jakob De Haan, and David-Jan Jansen 
(2008). “Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and 
Evidence”, Journal of Economic Literature, 46(4), 910-45. 
Branch, William (2004). “The Theory of Rationally Heterogeneous Expectations: Evidence 
from Survey Data on Inflation Expectations”, Economic Journal, 114, 592–621. 
Branch, William (2007). “Sticky Information and Model Uncertainty in Survey Data on 
Inflation Expectations”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31, 245–76. 
Bullard, James, and Kaushik Mitra (2002). “Learning about monetary policy rules” Journal of 
Monetary Economics 49, 1105-1129. 
Burgess, Stephen, Emilio Fernandez-Corugedo, Charlotta Groth, Richard Harrison, 
Francesca Monti, Konstantinos Theodoridis and Matt Waldron (2013). “The Bank of 
England's forecasting platform: COMPASS, MAPS, EASE and the suite of models”, Bank 
of England Working Paper, No. 471. 
22 
 
Campbell, Jeffrey, Charles Evans, Jonas Fisher and Alejandro Justiniano (2012). 
“Macroeconomic Effects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance”, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, Spring 2012, 1-80. 
Campbell, Jeffrey, Jonas Fisher, Alejandro Justiniano and Leonardo Melosi (2016). “Forward 
Guidance and Macroeconomic Outcomes Since the Financial Crisis”, In NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 2016, Volume 31. University of Chicago Press. 
Capistran, Carlos and Allan Timmermann (2009). “Disagreement and Biases in Inflation 
Expectations,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41, 365–396. 
Carroll, Christopher (2003). “Macroeconomic expectations of households and professional 
forecasters”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 269-298. 
Castelnuovo, Efrem, and Paolo Surico (2010). “Monetary Policy, Inflation Expectations and 
the Price Puzzle”, Economic Journal, 120(549), 1262-1283. 
Cloyne, James, and Patrick Huertgen (2016). “The macroeconomic effects of monetary policy: 
a new measure for the United Kingdom”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 
8(4), 75-102. 
Coibion, Olivier, and Yuriy Gorodnichenko (2012). “What Can Survey Forecasts Tell Us 
about Informational Rigidities?” Journal of Political Economy, 120(1), 116–59. 
Coibion, Olivier, and Yuriy Gorodnichenko (2015). “Information Rigidity and the 
Expectations Formation Process: A Simple Framework and New Facts”, American 
Economic Review, 105(8), 2644-2678. 
Crowe, Christopher (2010). “Testing the transparency benefits of inflation targeting: 
Evidence from private sector forecasts”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 57, 226–232. 
Dräger, Lena, Michael Lamla and Damjan Pfajfar (2016). “Are Survey Expectations Theory-
Consistent? The Role of Central Bank Communication and News”, European Economic 
Review, 85, 84-111. 
Ehrmann , Michael (2015). “Targeting Inflation from Below - How Do Inflation Expectations 
Behave?”, International Journal of Central Banking, 11(S1), 213-249. 
Ehrmann, Michael and Marcel Fratzscher (2007). “Communication by central bank 
committee members: Different strategies, same effectiveness“, Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking, 39(2–3), 509–541. 
Evans, George, and Seppo Honkapohja (2001). Learning and Expectations in 
Macroeconomics. Princeton University Press. 
Fendel, Ralf, Eliza Lis, and Jan‐Christoph Rülke (2011). “Do professional forecasters believe 
in the Phillips curve? Evidence from G7 countries”, Journal of Forecasting, 30(2), 268-87. 
Garcia, René (2002). “Are the Effects of Monetary Policy Asymmetric?”, Economic Inquiry, 
40(1), 102-119. 
Gertler, Mark and Peter Karadi (2015). “Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and 
Economic Activity,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(1), 44-76. 
Gürkaynak, Refet, Brian Sack, and Eric Swanson (2005). “Do Actions Speak Louder Than 
Words? The Response of Asset Prices to Monetary Policy Actions and Statements”, 
International Journal of Central Banking, 1(1), 55–93. 
Gürkaynak, Refet, Andrew Levin, and Eric Swanson (2010a). “Does Inflation Targeting 
Anchor Long-Run Inflation Expectations? Evidence from Long-Term Bond Yields in the 
US, UK, and Sweden”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(6), 1208-42. 
Gürkaynak, Refet, Brian Sack and John Wright (2010b). “The TIPS yield curve and inflation 
compensation”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(1), 70–92. 
Hayo, Bernd, and Matthias Neuenkirch (2010). “Do Federal Reserve communications help 
predict federal funds target rate decisions?”, Journal of Macroeconomics, 32(4), 1014-1024. 
Hubert, Paul (2014). “FOMC Forecasts as a Focal Point for Private Expectations”, Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, 46(7), 1381-1420. 
23 
 
Hubert, Paul (2015). “Do Central Bank Forecasts Influence Private Agents? Forecasting 
Performance vs. Signals”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 47(4), 771-789. 
Hubert, Paul (2017). “Qualitative and Quantitative Central Bank Communication and 
Inflation Expectations”, B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 7(1), 1-41. 
Hubert, Paul and Becky Maule (2016). “Policy and macro signals as inputs to inflation 
expectation formation”, Bank of England Working Paper, No. 581. 
Jansen, David-Jan, and Jakob De Haan (2009). “Does ECB communication help in predicting 
its interest rate decisions?”, Applied Economics, 41(16), 1995-2003. 
Jordà, Oscar (2005). “Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local Projections”, 
American Economic Review, 95(1), 161–182. 
Joyce, Michael, Matthew Tong and Robert Woods (2011). “The United Kingdom’s 
quantitative easing policy: design, operation and impact”, Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin, 51, 200–212. 
King, Robert, Yang Lu, and Ernesto Pasten (2008). “Managing Expectations”, Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, 40(8), 1625-1666. 
Kohlhas, Alexandre (2014). “Learning-by-sharing: Monetary policy and the information 
content of public signals”, manuscript. 
Krippner, Leo (2013). “Measuring the stance of monetary policy in zero lower bound 
environments”, Economics Letters, 118(1), 135-138. 
Krippner, Leo (2014). “Measuring the Stance of Monetary Policy in Conventional and 
Unconventional Environments”, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis Working 
Paper, No. 6/2014. 
Lo, Ming, and Jeremy Piger (2005). “Is the Response of Output to Monetary Policy 
Asymmetric? Evidence from a Regime-Switching Coefficients Model”, Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, 37(5), 865-86. 
Mankiw, Gregory, and Ricardo Reis (2002). “Sticky information versus sticky prices: A 
proposal to replace the new Keynesian Phillips curve“, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
117(4), 1295-1328. 
Melosi, Leonardo (2017). “Signaling effects of monetary policy”, Review of Economic Studies, 
84(2), 853-884. 
Michelacci, Claudio, and Luigi Paciello (2017). “Ambiguous Policy Announcements”, mimeo. 
Miranda-Agrippino, Silvia (2016). “Unsurprising Shocks: Information, Premia, and the 
Monetary Transmission”, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 626. 
Miranda-Agrippino, Silvia, and Giovanni Ricco (2017). “The Transmission of Monetary 
Policy Shocks”, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 657. 
Morris, Stephen, and Hyun Shin (2002). “Social Value of Public Information”, American 
Economic Review, 92(5), 1521–1534. 
Moscarini, Giuseppe (2004). “Limited Information Capacity as a Source of Inertia”, Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 28(10), 2003–2035. 
Nakamura, Emi, and Jón Steinsson (2017). “High Frequency Identification of Monetary Non-
Neutrality: The Information Effect”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming. 
Nunes, Ricardo (2010). “Inflation Dynamics: The Role of Expectations”, Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, 42(6), 1161–1172. 
Orphanides, Athanasios (2001). “Monetary Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data”, American 
Economic Review, 91, 964–985. 
Orphanides, Athanasios (2003). ‘Historical monetary policy analysis and the Taylor rule’, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, 983–1022. 
Orphanides, Athanasios, and John Williams (2005). “The decline of activist stabilization 
policy: Natural rate misperceptions, learning, and expectations”, Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 29(11), 1927-1950. 
24 
 
Paloviita, Maritta, and Matti Viren (2013). “Are individual survey expectations internally 
consistent?”, National Bank of Poland Working Paper, No. 140. 
Reis, Ricardo (2013). “Central Bank Design”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(4), 17-44. 
Rosa, Carlo, and Giovanni Verga (2007). “On the consistency and effectiveness of central 
bank communication: Evidence from the ECB”, European Journal of Political Economy, 
23(1), 146-175. 
Romer, Christina, and David Romer (2000). “Federal Reserve Information and the Behavior 
of Interest Rates”, American Economic Review, 90, 429-457. 
Romer, Christina, and David Romer (2004). “A New Measure of Monetary Shocks: 
Derivation and Implications”, American Economic Review, 94, 1055–1084. 
Santoro, Emiliano, Ivan Petrella, Damjan Pfajfar and Edoardo Gaffeo (2014). “Loss aversion 
and the asymmetric transmission of monetary policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 68, 
19-36. 
Scotti, Chiara (2016). “Surprise and Uncertainty Indexes: Real-Time Aggregation of Real-
Activity Macro Surprises”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 82, 1-19. 
Siklos, Pierre (2017). “What has publishing inflation forecasts accomplished? Central banks 
and their competitors”, CAMA Working Paper, No. 33. 
Sims, Christopher (1972). “Money, Income, and Causality,” American Economic Review, 62(4), 
540–552. 
Sims, Christopher (1992). “Interpreting the macroeconomic time series facts: the effects of 
monetary policy”, European Economic Review, 36(5), 975-1000. 
Sims, Christopher (2003). “Implications of Rational Inattention”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 50, 665–690. 
Soderlind, Paul (2011). “Inflation Risk Premia and Survey Evidence on Macroeconomic 
Uncertainty”, International Journal of Central Banking, 7(2), 113-133. 
Sturm, Jan-Egbert, and Jakob De Haan (2011). “Does central bank communication really lead 
to better forecasts of policy decisions? New evidence based on a Taylor rule model for 
the ECB”, Review of World Economics, 147(1), 41-58. 
Swanson, Eric (2006). “Have increases in Federal Reserve transparency improved private 
sector interest rate forecasts.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38, 792-819. 
Tang, Jenny (2015). “Uncertainty and the signaling channel of monetary policy”, FRB Boston 
Working Paper, No. 15-8. 
Taylor, John (1993). “Discretion versus policy rules in practice”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference 
Series on Public Policy, 39, 195-214. North-Holland. 
Teräsvirta, Timo (1994). “Specification, estimation, and evaluation of smooth transition 
autoregressive models”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 89(425), 208–218. 
Tenreyro, Silvana and Gregory Thwaites (2016). “Pushing on a string: US monetary policy is 
less powerful in recessions”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 8(4), 43-74. 
Walsh, Carl (2007). “Optimal economic transparency”, International Journal of Central Banking, 
3(1), 5-36. 
Weise, Charles (1999). “The Asymmetric Effects of Monetary Policy: A Nonlinear Vector 
Autoregression Approach”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 31(1), 85-108. 
Woodford, Michael (2001). “Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of Monetary 
Policy,” NBER Working Paper, No. 8673. 
Woodford, Michael (2005). “Central-bank communication and policy effectiveness“, In: The 
Greenspan era: Lessons for the future, 399–474. Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City. 
Wu, Cynthia and Fan Xia (2016). “Measuring the macroeconomic impact of monetary policy 
at the Zero lower bound”, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 48(2-3), 253-291. 
 
 
25 
 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_10y
BoE_ShadowRate * Dummy IR -0.025 -0.045 -0.045 -0.037 -0.024 0.050
[0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05]
BoE_ShadowRate -0.084** -0.046 -0.025 -0.016 -0.014 -0.032
[0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Dummy IR 0.023 -0.018 -0.027 -0.022 -0.013 0.004
[0.04] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Lag dep var 0.644*** 0.637*** 0.669*** 0.737*** 0.790*** 0.688***
[0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.08] [0.06] [0.10]
Constant 0.972** 0.995** 0.932*** 0.802*** 0.712*** 1.245***
[0.45] [0.38] [0.33] [0.28] [0.24] [0.36]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.59 0.57 0.58 0.71 0.84 0.94
BoE_ShadowRate coefficient when:
Dummy IR = 1 -0.109* -0.091** -0.070** -0.053** -0.038* 0.018
[0.06] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
BoE_ShadowRate when IR = 0 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06
BoE_ShadowRate when IR = 1 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.06
Table 1 - The effect of monetary shocks in IR and non-IR months
Partial R² - Variance decomposition
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (6) estimated for a different horizon with
OLS. For parsimony, only the key coefficients are reported. Complete tables are available from the
authors upon request. X t includes a news variable capturing the information flow between t-1 and t  of 
macro data releases related to inflation, the real activity, uncertainty and news indices of Scotti (2016),
the changes in the FTSE and UK move indices. Z t includes CPI, industrial production, oil prices, the
sterling effective exchange rate, net lending, housing prices. To facilitate the reading of the interacted
effects, we compute the coefficient associated with the monetary shock when the dummy equals 1.
BoE_ShadowRate * Dummy for the publication of BoE's projections
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1 2 3 4 5 6
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_10y
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.434** -0.272** -0.195* -0.163* -0.133** 0.062
[0.21] [0.13] [0.10] [0.09] [0.07] [0.14]
BoE_ShadowRate -0.086** -0.053** -0.032 -0.023 -0.018 -0.024
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02]
BoE_cpi_4 0.119 0.053 0.019 -0.006 -0.026 -0.078
[0.10] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.145 0.104 0.087 0.082 0.075 0.007
[0.16] [0.11] [0.10] [0.09] [0.07] [0.07]
Lag dep var 0.640*** 0.627*** 0.655*** 0.725*** 0.783*** 0.683***
[0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.08] [0.06] [0.10]
Constant 0.962** 1.000*** 0.951*** 0.822*** 0.726*** 1.269***
[0.44] [0.37] [0.32] [0.28] [0.24] [0.38]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.71 0.84 0.94
BoE_ShadowRate coefficient when:
Δ+ BoE_cpi_4 -0.182*** -0.113*** -0.075** -0.058** -0.048** -0.011
[0.06] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
Δ- BoE_cpi_4 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.013 0.011 -0.038
[0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.05]
BoE_ShadowRate alone 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
BoE_ShadowRate interacted 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
Table 2 - The effect of monetary shocks when interacted with inflation projection surprises
BoE_ShadowRate * 4-quarter BoE projection surprises
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (6) estimated for a different horizon with
OLS. For parsimony, only the key coefficients are reported. Complete tables are available from the
authors upon request. X t  includes a news variable capturing the information flow between t-1 and t  of 
macro data releases related to inflation, the real activity, uncertainty and news indices of Scotti (2016),
the changes in the FTSE and UK move indices. Z t includes CPI, industrial production, oil prices, the
sterling effective exchange rate, net lending, housing prices. To facilitate the reading of the interacted
effects, we compute the coefficient associated with the monetary shock for positive (mean + 1.5 S.D.)
or negative (mean - 1.5 S.D.) projection surprises.
Partial R² - Variance decomposition
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1 2 3 4 5 6
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_10y
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -1.176** -0.695* -0.492* -0.411* -0.345* 0.043
[0.58] [0.36] [0.28] [0.23] [0.18] [0.17]
BoE_ShadowRate coefficient when:
Δ+ BoE_cpi_4 -0.383** -0.247** -0.187** -0.156** -0.130** 0.005
[0.17] [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.05] [0.03]
Δ- BoE_cpi_4 0.134 0.059 0.030 0.024 0.022 -0.014
[0.13] [0.08] [0.06] [0.05] [0.04] [0.05]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.299** -0.191* -0.131 -0.107 -0.088 -0.001
[0.12] [0.11] [0.12] [0.11] [0.09] [0.07]
BoE_ShadowRate coefficient when:
Δ+ BoE_cpi_4 -0.120*** -0.051 -0.015 -0.007 -0.011 -0.040
[0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02]
Δ- BoE_cpi_4 0.011 0.033 0.043* 0.040* 0.028 -0.040
[0.04] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (6) estimated for a different horizon
with OLS. For parsimony, only the key coefficients are reported. Complete tables are available from
the authors upon request.
Table 3 - Subsample estimations: pre and post ZLB
Pre ZLB
Post ZLB
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Figure 1 – Exogenous shocks 
for the Bank of England’s shadow rate, and inflation and output projections 
 
 
Note: The shocks plotted on these panels are estimated from 
equations (7)-(8). Parameters are presented in Table 1. 
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Figure 2 – Local projections 
 
 
 
Note: Impulse responses to a monetary shock when interacted with positive (black line) or negative (blue 
line) projection surprises, over 6 months, estimated with equation (6) using local projections as described in 
equation (9) with one standard error confidence intervals. The coefficient associated with the monetary 
shock is computed for positive (mean + 1.5 S.D.) or negative (mean - 1.5 S.D.) projection surprises. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Correcting Market-based Expectation Measures 
 
We aim to derive accurate estimates of market-based measures of inflation expectations by 
correcting inflation compensation, as measured by inflation swaps, for term, liquidity and 
inflation risk premia. Market-based measures of inflation compensation are an appropriate 
indicator of inflation expectations if investors are risk neutral and there is no liquidity 
premium. However, that is unlikely to be the case, and these premia might have sizable 
values and be time-varying. We use a model-free regression approach to correct our 
compensation measure, rather than a no arbitrage approach based on term-structure models. 
 
Gürkaynak et al. (2010a, 2010b) and Soderlind (2011) decompose inflation compensation, 
𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃, obtained from financial swaps into: expected inflation, 𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝑃𝐹 , a liquidity premium, 
𝜑𝑡,ℎ
𝑙 , that investors demand to encourage them to hold these assets when they are illiquid, 
and an inflation uncertainty premium, 𝜑𝑡,ℎ
𝑖𝑟 , that compensates investors for bearing inflation 
risk.1 We also include a term premium, 𝜑𝑡,ℎ
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘, compensating investors for holding a risky 
asset.2 Assuming t is the time subscript and h is the horizon of inflation expectations, this 
breakdown can be written: 
𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃
  =   𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝑃𝐹
  +   𝜑𝑡,ℎ
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 +  𝜑𝑡,ℎ
𝑙  +  𝜑𝑡,ℎ
𝑖𝑟        (A1) 
 
We estimate a linear regression model of inflation compensation on proxy measures 
capturing the different premia. In the spirit of Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) who control 
for risk premium using bond ratings, the credit risk premium is proxied by the Libor-OIS 
spread and by the average of UK major banks’ CDS premia.  Those measures should capture 
the riskiness of holding financial instruments, especially during the global financial crisis. 
The liquidity premium is proxied by the FTSE Volatility index (the UK-equivalent of the 
VIX), following Gürkaynak et al. (2010b) and Soderlind (2011). 3  For the inflation risk 
premium, we use the implied volatility from swaptions – options on short-term interest rate 
swaps – maturing in 20 years which captures inflation uncertainty, following Soderlind 
(2011).4 This leads us to estimate the following equation: 
𝜋𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃
 
 = 𝛼 + 𝛽ℎ
𝑠 spread + 𝛽ℎ
𝑐𝑑𝑠 cds + 𝛽ℎ
𝑓
 ftsev + 𝛽ℎ
𝑖  impvol + 𝜀𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃  (A2) 
 
                                                          
1 Because the central bank may intend to affect the inflation risk premium as well as inflation expectations, we 
also compute adjusted series for term and liquidity premia only and assess the effect of this alternative in table 
A4.  
2 The term premium has been neglected in most of the literature so far for two reasons. First, most of the studies 
focus on US treasury bonds and TIPS, and therefore implicitly assume there is no credit risk, those bonds being 
considered as risk-free (see Gürkaynak et al. 2010b). Second, when considering swap contracts to derive inflation 
expectations, the collateral is supposed to remove any potential credit risk. However, in a post-Great Recession 
sample in which sovereign bonds have been shown to be not as risk-free as previously thought and collateral 
value may have changed rapidly, we explicitly assess whether proxies for credit risk correlate with supposedly 
risk-free inflation compensation rather than assuming ex ante the absence of a term premium. 
3 An extension would be to correct for the micro liquidity premium affecting investors’ appetite for inflation 
hedging instruments compared to nominal instruments and for the maturity-specific liquidity premium affecting 
investors’ appetite for each maturity differently. One option would be to use maturity-specific residuals from a 
fitted term structure model as a proxy for maturity-specific liquidity premia (Garcia and Fontaine 2009, Hu, Pan 
and Wang 2013) and the average of all yield curve fitting errors for indexed bonds over the average of all yield 
curve fitting errors for nominal bonds to capture the micro liquidity premium.   
4 An alternative indicator to measure inflation uncertainty more precisely would be the standard deviation of the 
probability density function of inflation options maturing in 10 years, which are available for the UK only since 
2007. Over the same sample, the correlation between this measure and our proxy is 0.76. 
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We estimate equation (A2) using OLS. We use monthly observations – calculated simply as 
the average of daily observations. And we estimate it separately for each horizon of inflation 
compensation from 1 year ahead to 5 years ahead and 10 years ahead. The term, liquidity 
and inflation risk premia – directly related to inflation uncertainty – should all push inflation 
compensation up.5 So we expect the coefficients on the LIBOR-OIS spread, CDS premia, the 
FTSE Volatility index (ftsev) and implied volatility (impvol) variables to be positive.6 We also 
expect the term and inflation risk premia to increase with the maturity of the swap. We 
estimate equation (A2) on the full sample and on two subsamples pre and post ZLB. Because 
the ZLB may affect the transmission of shocks and macro and financial dynamics, the pricing 
relationship of premia may also change pre and post ZLB. Table A3 in the Appendix shows 
the estimated coefficients for each maturity of the term structure of inflation expectations.  
 
Using these estimated parameters, we adjust the inflation compensation series by subtracting 
the fitted values of the contributions of the term, liquidity and inflation risk premia to obtain 
corrected inflation expectation series. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows on the left-hand side 
the raw inflation compensation series and the corrected inflation expectations series (either 
with constant pricing or pre/post ZLB pricing), and on the right-hand side the evolution of 
the estimated term premium (in blue), the liquidity premium (in red) and the inflation risk 
premium (in green) in the constant pricing estimation.7 While the risk proxies started to 
become non-null and positive in mid-2007, they had effects of different signs for short and 
long maturities during the financial turmoil of late 2008: they had a negative contribution to 
inflation compensation when financial stress was most acute after Lehman Brothers’ collapse 
for maturities under 6-years, pushing inflation compensation to negative values, whereas 
their effects remained positive for longer maturities. After this episode of severe financial 
stress, the term premium had a positive contribution for all maturities of around 20-50 basis 
points. The liquidity premium spiked at almost 120 basis points for longer maturities in the 
second half of 2008 and remained elevated at around 40-50 basis points after that. The 
inflation risk premium has declined over time, particularly at longer maturities, and became 
negative during 2011 (moving from +20 basis points to -10 basis points), which might be 
associated with the implementation of QE. Overall, the correction results in flatter series for 
inflation expectations and in lower inflation expectations at the longer horizons for which the 
difference between the unadjusted and adjusted series is larger. 
 
Overall, for compensation measures ten-years ahead, we estimate that the total combined 
premium has averaged about 60 basis points since 2004, and has varied between around 30 
and 160 basis points. For comparison, D’Amico, Kim and Wei (2010) find that the liquidity 
premium on US TIPS has varied between 0 and 130 basis points. Gürkaynak et al. (2010b) 
find that the liquidity premium has varied between 0 and 140 basis points.  Risa (2001) finds 
an inflation risk premium in the UK of around 170 basis points, and Joyce et al. (2010) 
estimate it to be between 75 and 100 basis points. Ang et al. (2008) find an inflation risk 
premium of between 10 and 140 basis points in the US over the last two decades. Finally, 
using Gaussian affine dynamic term structure models, Guimarães (2012) finds a total 
                                                          
5 This is in contrast to inflation compensation derived from inflation indexed bonds, for which we would expect 
the liquidity proxy to have a negative coefficient, because they are generally less liquid than nominal bonds. 
6 Because these proxies might be correlated with the business cycle, we use an alternative methodology based on 
survey expectation measures that do not contain these various premia by construction. We consider the predicted 
value of market-based expectations when regressed on survey expectations, which we use as instruments. 
7 The constant in equation (A2) may include other constants related to term, liquidity or inflation risk. This does 
not invalidate the main result since the mean of inflation expectations is not needed when estimating equation (6). 
However, the series on the left-hand side of Figure A1 should be considered cautiously and is only indicative. 
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combined premium of 190 basis points over 1985-1992 and of 30 basis points over 1997-2002 
for 10-years inflation compensation derived from UK gilts. 
 
The correlation between the original and (constant pricing) corrected series is 0.74, 0.84, 0.94, 
0.97, 0.91 and 0.69 for each maturity from 1-year to 5-years and 10-years respectively. The 
correlation between the original and (pre/post ZLB pricing) corrected series is 0.73, 0.75, 
0.80, 0.79, 0.67 and 0.46 for each maturity from 1-year to 5-years and 10-years respectively. 
We use the pre/post ZLB pricing corrected series in our benchmark analysis and provide 
estimates using the constant pricing corrected series in the robustness section.  
 
We also assess the robustness of our main result using the original raw market-based 
measures –inflation compensation–, so as to observe the impact of the correction for the term, 
liquidity, and inflation risk premia. In addition, because the central bank may intend to affect 
the inflation risk premium as well as inflation expectations, we also compute adjusted series 
for term and liquidity premia only. Finally, because the proxies we use to correct inflation 
compensation for the different premia might be correlated with the business cycle, we turn 
to an alternative methodology using survey expectation measures that do not contain these 
various premia. We regress market-based expectations on their 1-year trend and survey 
expectations and consider the predicted value as our adjusted series. Table A9 provides 
estimates of these alternative specifications and shows that our main result is robust to the 
correction of premia. 
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Variable Source Description
PF_h
Bloomberg and Bank of 
England calculations
Inflation expectation measures derived from inflation swaps.
Instantaneous forward inflation rates for annual RPI inflation h years
ahead. Monthly average of daily observations. 
BoE_ShadowRate Bank of England Bank Rate adjusted for internal estimates of the impact of QE.
BoE_ShadowRate1 Wu and Xia (2016) UK shadow rate estimated using a nonlinear term structure model.
BoE_ShadowRate2 Krippner (2013, 2014) UK shadow rate estimated using a two state-variable yield curve model.
Bank Rate Bank of England Bank of England's policy interest rate.
BoE_cpi_h Bank of England
Bank of England's modal projections for annual CPI inflation h quarters
ahead, based on market interest rate expectations. 
BoE_gdp_h Bank of England
Bank of England's modal projections for annual GDP growth h quarters
ahead, based on market interest rate expectations. 
FG Authors' computation
Dummy that equals 1 during the period for which Forward Guidance on
policy is in place.
ZLB Authors' computation
Dummy that equals 1 during the period Ban Rate is at its effective lower
bound of 0.5%.
mc_h Bank of England
Market interest rate curve used as conditioning path for BoE's
macroeconomic projections.
PF_gdp_h
Consensus Forecasts / 
Survey of External 
Forecasters
Consensus Forecasts' average projections for annual GDP growth h
quarters ahead, for h=1 to 6. Survey of External Forecasters' average
projections for annual GDP growth h quarters ahead, for h=8 and 12.
Monthly constant interpolation from quarterly frequency.
Oil FRED Crude oil spot prices, Brent - Europe. Annual % change.
Sterling Bank of England Effective exchange rate index, January 2005 = 100. Annual % change.
CPI ONS Annual % change in the Consumer Price Index.
Indpro ONS Annual real Industrial Production growth seasonally adjusted. 
Netlending Bank of England
12 month growth rate of monetary financial institutions' sterling net
lending to private non-financial corporations (excluding the effects of
securitisations and loan transfers) (SA).
Housing Halifax and Nationwide
Average of (SA) Halifax and Nationwide measures of average house
prices. Annual % change.
RPI surprises ONS and Bloomberg
Difference between the outturn for annual RPI inflation in a given month
and the market median forecast 1 month before.
scottiactiv Scotti (2016) 
UK real-time real activity index, capturing the state of economic
conditions.
scottinews Scotti (2016) UK real-time surprise index, summarizing economic data surprises.
scottiuncert Scotti (2016) 
UK real-time uncertainty index, measuring uncertainty related to the
state of the economy.
FTSE Bloomberg FTSE all-share index. Annual change.
UKmove Bank of England
The Merrill lynch Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE) Index is a yield
curve weighted index of the normalized implied volatility on 1-month
UK gilt options which are weighted on the 2, 5, 10, and 30 year contracts. 
It is the bond market's equivalent of the VIX.
LIBOR-OIS
FRED and Thomson 
DataStream
3-Month London Interbank Offered Rate and 3-Month Overnight Indexed 
Swap rates. Monthly average of daily observations.
CDS
Markit Group Limited 
and BoE calculations
Unweighted average of the five-year CDS premia for the major UK
lenders. Monthly average of daily observations.
FTSE-Vol Bloomberg
FTSE 100 Implied Volatility Index, 3 months constant maturity. Monthly
average of daily obs.
ImpVol20 Barclays Live
At-the-money implied volatility of 1 year LIBOR swaptions, 20 years
constant maturity. Monthly average of daily observations.
Table A1 - Data description
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
PF_1y 126 3.13 0.38 1.50 4.15
PF_2y 126 3.07 0.26 2.04 3.72
PF_3y 126 3.02 0.22 2.19 3.57
PF_4y 126 3.02 0.23 2.23 3.42
PF_5y 126 3.05 0.27 2.26 3.50
PF_10y 126 3.25 0.45 2.50 3.91
BoE_ShadowRate 125 0.00 0.06 -0.27 0.20
BoE_ShadowRate1 125 0.00 0.29 -0.84 1.82
BoE_ShadowRate2 125 0.00 0.46 -1.35 2.36
Bank Rate 125 0.00 0.12 -0.51 0.34
BoE_cpi_4 126 0.00 0.15 -0.48 0.61
BoE_cpi_8 126 0.00 0.06 -0.15 0.30
BoE_gdp_4 126 0.00 0.13 -0.50 0.41
BoE_gdp_8 126 0.00 0.11 -0.37 0.42
mc_1y 125 2.42 2.02 0.22 5.93
mc_2y 125 2.88 1.81 0.28 5.89
mc_3y 125 3.22 1.61 0.56 5.79
PF_gdp_1 126 1.42 1.67 -3.90 3.10
PF_gdp_4 126 1.81 0.73 -0.70 2.60
PF_gdp_8 126 2.30 0.24 1.82 2.63
Oil 126 14.88 35.21 -56.10 86.40
Sterling 126 -1.07 6.49 -21.60 11.00
CPI 126 2.62 1.04 0.00 5.20
Indpro 126 -0.98 3.44 -11.10 5.10
Netlending 126 4.65 8.77 -4.40 19.60
Housing 126 2.71 7.27 -17.10 17.60
RPI surprises 126 0.03 0.17 -0.50 0.70
scottiactiv 126 -0.17 0.62 -2.44 0.51
scottinews 126 -0.08 0.28 -0.96 0.53
scottiuncert 126 0.92 0.32 0.41 1.98
FTSE 126 6.04 15.50 -36.20 51.20
UKmove 126 90.32 32.55 52.59 220.01
LIBOR-OIS 126 0.34 0.41 0.09 2.21
CDS 126 0.97 0.73 0.06 2.61
FTSE-Vol 126 17.59 7.53 8.85 48.68
ImpVol20 126 -1.42 5.48 -12.93 7.16
Table A2 - Descriptive statistics
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1 2 3 4 5 6
swap_1y swap_2y swap_3y swap_4y swap_5y swap_10y
LIBOR-OIS -0.867** -0.732** -0.597** -0.465** -0.347* 0.034
[0.42] [0.30] [0.25] [0.21] [0.19] [0.13]
CDS 0.996*** 0.963*** 0.846*** 0.733*** 0.637*** 0.393***
[0.29] [0.21] [0.17] [0.15] [0.13] [0.09]
FTSE-Vol -0.044* -0.030* -0.019 -0.009 -0.001 0.017**
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
ImpVol20 -0.037* -0.028* -0.027** -0.027** -0.027*** -0.026***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Constant 3.064*** 3.031*** 2.965*** 2.889*** 2.825*** 2.748***
[0.25] [0.18] [0.15] [0.13] [0.11] [0.08]
N 53 53 53 53 53 53
R² 0.53 0.51 0.45 0.44 0.55 0.91
LIBOR-OIS -1.183*** -0.174 0.138 0.304** 0.396*** 0.289**
[0.26] [0.17] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14]
CDS 0.219** -0.08 -0.167*** -0.207*** -0.232*** -0.253***
[0.09] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
FTSE-Vol -0.017 -0.003 0.006 0.009 0.011 0.016**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
ImpVol20 -0.030** 0.006 0.011 0.006 0.000 -0.014**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Constant 3.186*** 3.099*** 3.054*** 3.121*** 3.217*** 3.611***
[0.18] [0.12] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10]
N 73 73 73 73 73 73
R² 0.40 0.22 0.16 0.26 0.40 0.55
LIBOR-OIS -0.881*** -0.412*** -0.263* -0.166 -0.096 0.038
[0.20] [0.15] [0.14] [0.13] [0.12] [0.13]
CDS 0.349*** 0.170*** 0.117** 0.095** 0.084* 0.065
[0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.05]
FTSE-Vol -0.021* -0.013 -0.004 0.004 0.011 0.030***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
ImpVol20 -0.030*** -0.014* -0.01 -0.009 -0.009 0.001
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Constant 2.982*** 3.005*** 2.952*** 2.906*** 2.875*** 2.882***
[0.13] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
N 126 126 126 126 126 126
R² 0.46 0.29 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.53
Table A3 - Correction of raw market-based measures for premia
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column
corresponds to equation (A2) for a different horizon and estimated with OLS.
Pre ZLB sample
Post ZLB sample
No subsample
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1 2 3 4 5
Δ BoE_ShadowRate BoE_cpi_4 BoE_cpi_8 BoE_gdp_4 BoE_gdp_8
L.BoE_ShadowRate -0.019 L.BoE_ShadowRate -0.397** -0.284*** -0.757*** -0.158
[0.01] [0.15] [0.07] [0.14] [0.12]
L.PCA_PF_cpi 0.015*** L.PCA_PF_cpi -0.059 -0.013 -0.133*** -0.085**
[0.00] [0.05] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04]
L.PCA_PF_gdp 0.017* L.PCA_PF_gdp 0.097 0.142*** 0.016 -0.071
[0.01] [0.11] [0.05] [0.10] [0.08]
BoE_cpi_4 0.014 L.BoE_cpi_4 -0.172 -0.04 -0.374* 0.117
[0.03] [0.23] [0.10] [0.21] [0.18]
BoE_cpi_8 0.143 L.BoE_cpi_8 0.503 0.507 0.904 -0.54
[0.10] [0.85] [0.36] [0.77] [0.66]
BoE_cpi_12 -0.056 L.BoE_cpi_12 -0.869 -0.638 -0.758 0.771
[0.12] [1.01] [0.43] [0.91] [0.78]
BoE_gdp_4 0.042 L.BoE_gdp_4 0.095 -0.406*** 0.312 0.226
[0.03] [0.26] [0.11] [0.23] [0.20]
BoE_gdp_8 -0.019 L.BoE_gdp_8 -0.472 0.359** 0.059 -0.359
[0.05] [0.40] [0.17] [0.37] [0.32]
BoE_gdp_12 -0.001 L.BoE_gdp_12 -0.145 -0.409** 0.586 0.848**
[0.05] [0.40] [0.17] [0.36] [0.31]
Δ BoE_cpi_4 -0.007 mc_1y 1.925*** 1.132*** 0.468 -1.157**
[0.03] [0.57] [0.24] [0.52] [0.45]
Δ BoE_cpi_8 0.153 mc_2y -2.908* -1.545** 0.174 2.601**
[0.11] [1.47] [0.62] [1.33] [1.14]
Δ BoE_cpi_12 -0.117 mc_3y 1.727 0.900* 0.084 -1.500*
[0.13] [1.05] [0.45] [0.96] [0.82]
Δ BoE_gdp_4 -0.019 . . . . .
[0.04]
Δ BoE_gdp_8 -0.015 . . . . .
[0.06]
Δ BoE_gdp_12 0.059 . . . . .
[0.07]
Constant -0.264 Constant 3.999** 3.455*** -0.900 -0.984
[0.19] [1.49] [0.63] [1.36] [1.16]
Controls: Zt-1 & IRt Yes Controls: Zt-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 N 42 42 42 42
R² 0.85 R² 0.80 0.92 0.92 0.79
Mean SD Min Max AR(1) AR(3)
BoE_ShadowRate 0.00 0.06 -0.27 0.20 0.29*** 0.07
BoE_cpi_4 0.00 0.15 -0.48 0.61 0.00 0.04
BoE_cpi_8 0.00 0.06 -0.15 0.30 0.00 -0.18*
BoE_gdp_4 0.00 0.13 -0.50 0.41 0.00 0.02
BoE_gdp_8 0.00 0.11 -0.37 0.42 0.00 -0.21*
BoE_ShadowRate BoE_cpi_4 BoE_cpi_8 BoE_gdp_4 BoE_gdp_8
1
-0.12 1
-0.09 0.22 1
-0.04 0.02 0.15 1
0.06 -0.20 -0.20 0.66 1
BoE_ShadowRate BoE_cpi_4 BoE_cpi_8 BoE_gdp_4 BoE_gdp_8
0.31 0.98 0.59 0.77 0.78
0.99 0.48 0.88 0.71 0.70
0.54 0.60 0.45 0.67 0.44
0.97 0.94 0.99 0.90 0.99
Table A4 - Extracting Exogenous Shocks
Properties of exogenous shock series
Correlation of monetary shock and projection surprises
Predictability of exogenous shock series
BoE_gdp_8
BoE_gdp_4
BoE_cpi_8
BoE_cpi_4
BoE_ShadowRate
VAR(6) - p-value
VAR(6) - F-stat
VAR(3) - p -value
VAR(3) - F-stat
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. L is the lag operator and Δ the first difference operator.
Column 1 and columns 2 to 5 correspond to the OLS estimation of equation (7) and (8) respectively. The Z vector of
controls includes CPI, industrial production, net lending, housing prices as well as oil prices and the sterling effective
exchange rate.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_10y
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_8 0.584 0.393 0.287 0.220 0.135 -0.479
[0.62] [0.43] [0.35] [0.29] [0.23] [0.35]
BoE_ShadowRate -0.088** -0.052* -0.031 -0.021 -0.017 -0.025
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02]
BoE_cpi_8 -0.227 -0.049 0.028 0.059 0.069 0.065
[0.37] [0.27] [0.22] [0.18] [0.15] [0.16]
BoE_gdp_8 0.046 0.036 0.03 0.029 0.034 0.041
[0.17] [0.14] [0.12] [0.10] [0.08] [0.08]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_gdp_4 0.044 0.236 0.257 0.238 0.211 0.204
[0.41] [0.26] [0.20] [0.16] [0.13] [0.16]
BoE_ShadowRate -0.085** -0.050* -0.029 -0.02 -0.016 -0.022
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02]
BoE_cpi_4 0.170 0.058 0.012 -0.015 -0.035 -0.111
[0.15] [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.08]
BoE_gdp_4 0.066 0.032 0.026 0.028 0.03 -0.004
[0.16] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_gdp_8 -0.246 -0.097 -0.065 -0.021 0.040 0.413
[0.38] [0.26] [0.20] [0.16] [0.12] [0.24]
BoE_ShadowRate -0.089*** -0.054** -0.033 -0.023 -0.018 -0.025
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02]
BoE_cpi_8 -0.218 -0.066 0.013 0.038 0.039 -0.008
[0.37] [0.27] [0.22] [0.18] [0.14] [0.14]
BoE_gdp_8 0.096 0.069 0.054 0.046 0.042 -0.008
[0.18] [0.15] [0.13] [0.10] [0.08] [0.08]
Table A5 - Interaction of monetary shocks with longer-horizons BoE projection surprises
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_8
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_gdp_8
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (6) estimated for a different horizon with OLS.
For parsimony, only the key coefficients are reported. Complete tables are available from the authors
upon request.
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_gdp_4
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1 2 3 4 5 6
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_10y
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.342*** -0.295*** -0.248*** -0.194*** -0.135*** 0.082
[0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.04] [0.06]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.293** -0.260** -0.228** -0.194*** -0.152** 0.062
[0.13] [0.10] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.12]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.261 -0.158 -0.095 -0.070 -0.047 0.092
[0.22] [0.16] [0.13] [0.11] [0.09] [0.10]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.379*** -0.327*** -0.279*** -0.220*** -0.156*** 0.084
[0.14] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.08]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.362* -0.335*** -0.286*** -0.239*** -0.184*** 0.084
[0.18] [0.12] [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.15]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.224 -0.136 -0.083 -0.061 -0.042 0.078
[0.20] [0.14] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.09]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.310** -0.278*** -0.241*** -0.191*** -0.136*** 0.069
[0.13] [0.08] [0.07] [0.05] [0.04] [0.07]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.356** -0.302*** -0.250*** -0.209*** -0.162** 0.072
[0.14] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.06] [0.13]
BoE_BR/SR * BoE_cpi_4 -0.002 -0.017 -0.041 -0.066 -0.091 -0.200*
[0.21] [0.16] [0.14] [0.11] [0.09] [0.10]
BoE_BR/SR1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.592*** -0.432** -0.328* -0.263 -0.207* 0.008
[0.20] [0.20] [0.19] [0.16] [0.12] [0.11]
BoE_BR/SR2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.085 -0.121 -0.115 -0.101 -0.077 0.031
[0.17] [0.10] [0.09] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08]
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (6) estimated for a different horizon with OLS.
For parsimony, only the coefficient of the interaction variable is reported. Complete tables are available
from the authors upon request.
Bank Rate + Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Estimation on IR months only / Shocks prediction on all months
Benchmark identification
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2015)'s UK shadow rate
BoE's UK shadow rate
Two estimations (IR and non-IR months)
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Two estimations (Pre/Post ZLB)
Bank Rate + BoE's UK shadow rate
Bank Rate + Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Table A6 - Robustness: Policy variables and identification of monetary shocks
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
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1 2 3 4 5 6
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_10y
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.301 -0.189* -0.123 -0.099 -0.077 0.127
[0.19] [0.11] [0.09] [0.07] [0.05] [0.14]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.283** -0.250*** -0.219*** -0.171*** -0.115*** 0.095**
[0.13] [0.07] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.275 -0.257* -0.240* -0.202** -0.152* 0.048
[0.20] [0.14] [0.13] [0.10] [0.08] [0.12]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.117 0.052 0.052 0.020 -0.014 -0.066
[0.25] [0.15] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.09]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.263* -0.221** -0.200** -0.165** -0.119** 0.081
[0.14] [0.10] [0.08] [0.06] [0.05] [0.10]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.144 -0.168** -0.167** -0.154** -0.134** -0.119**
[0.11] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.289 -0.140 -0.078 -0.061 -0.055 0.009
[0.20] [0.13] [0.10] [0.08] [0.06] [0.06]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.378*** -0.330*** -0.277*** -0.219*** -0.156*** 0.089
[0.11] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.04] [0.07]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.208** -0.197*** -0.162** -0.129** -0.094* 0.068
[0.09] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.09]
BoE_SR * BoE_cpi_4 * Dummy Big -0.199 -0.196 -0.154 -0.103 -0.044 0.356
[0.39] [0.22] [0.18] [0.15] [0.14] [0.31]
BoE_SR1 * BoE_cpi_4 * Dummy Big -0.898** -0.782*** -0.617*** -0.446*** -0.270* 0.322
[0.37] [0.22] [0.18] [0.16] [0.14] [0.26]
BoE_SR2 * BoE_cpi_4 * Dummy Big -0.45 -0.460** -0.428** -0.343** -0.246** 0.019
[0.28] [0.20] [0.17] [0.13] [0.10] [0.18]
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (6) estimated for a different horizon with OLS.
For parsimony, only the coefficient of the interaction variable is reported. Complete tables are available
from the authors upon request.
No PCA variables in identification
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Disentangling small and big monetary shocks
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Table A7 - Robustness: Identification of monetary shocks
Taylor rule
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Cloyne-Huertgen (2016)
BoE's UK shadow rate
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1 2 3 4 5 6
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_10y
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.169 -0.152 -0.141 -0.126 -0.12 -0.136
[0.19] [0.16] [0.13] [0.11] [0.10] [0.08]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.570** -0.469** -0.352* -0.243* -0.170* -0.113
[0.25] [0.21] [0.18] [0.13] [0.10] [0.07]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.384* -0.216 -0.114 -0.065 -0.038 -0.019
[0.19] [0.16] [0.14] [0.11] [0.08] [0.10]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 . . . -0.294** -0.366*** -0.198
[0.12] [0.12] [0.16]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 . . . -0.221** -0.12 0.256*
[0.10] [0.07] [0.15]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 . . . -0.277** -0.260*** 0.028
[0.12] [0.09] [0.21]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.495 -0.296 -0.227 -0.18 -0.135 0.048
[0.31] [0.21] [0.17] [0.13] [0.10] [0.13]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.579*** -0.448*** -0.348*** -0.264*** -0.185*** 0.06
[0.17] [0.14] [0.11] [0.07] [0.05] [0.08]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.538*** -0.411*** -0.321*** -0.253*** -0.192*** -0.014
[0.19] [0.14] [0.12] [0.09] [0.06] [0.12]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.434** -0.272** -0.195* -0.163* -0.133** 0.062
[0.21] [0.13] [0.10] [0.09] [0.07] [0.14]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.342*** -0.295*** -0.248*** -0.194*** -0.135*** 0.082
[0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.04] [0.06]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.293** -0.260** -0.228** -0.194*** -0.152** 0.062
[0.13] [0.10] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.12]
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Deviation from target
BoE's UK shadow rate
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (6) estimated for a different horizon with OLS.
For parsimony, only the coefficient of the interaction variable is reported. Complete tables are available
from the authors upon request.
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Table A8 - Robustness: Alternative dependent variables
Last observation of the month
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Gilts
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
First difference
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
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1 2 3 4 5 6
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_10y
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.789*** -0.542*** -0.403*** -0.333*** -0.279*** -0.006
[0.30] [0.19] [0.15] [0.12] [0.10] [0.09]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.365*** -0.312*** -0.255*** -0.191*** -0.131*** 0.071
[0.11] [0.08] [0.07] [0.05] [0.04] [0.06]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.365*** -0.319*** -0.265** -0.216** -0.171** 0.008
[0.14] [0.12] [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.10]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.170* -0.04 -0.066* -0.037*** -0.071*** -0.032*
[0.09] [0.09] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.183*** -0.041 -0.011 -0.004 0.016 0.028
[0.07] [0.04] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.035 0.025 0.012 -0.006 0.033 0.048
[0.12] [0.08] [0.04] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.797** -0.543*** -0.405*** -0.337*** -0.283*** -0.01
[0.31] [0.20] [0.15] [0.12] [0.10] [0.09]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.396*** -0.324*** -0.262*** -0.196*** -0.134*** 0.072
[0.10] [0.07] [0.07] [0.05] [0.04] [0.07]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.383** -0.315** -0.261** -0.215** -0.171** 0.003
[0.15] [0.12] [0.11] [0.09] [0.07] [0.10]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.969*** -0.658*** -0.467*** -0.361*** -0.279*** 0.085
[0.33] [0.21] [0.15] [0.12] [0.09] [0.09]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.413*** -0.329*** -0.266*** -0.205*** -0.151*** 0.035
[0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.381** -0.302** -0.257** -0.219** -0.185*** -0.037
[0.15] [0.13] [0.11] [0.09] [0.06] [0.08]
Krippner (2015)'s UK shadow rate
Inflation compensation (no correction for risk, liquidity and inflation risk premia)
BoE's UK shadow rate
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (6) estimated for a different horizon with OLS.
For parsimony, only the coefficient of the interaction variable is reported. Complete tables are available
from the authors upon request.
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2015)'s UK shadow rate
Table A9 - Robustness: Alternative dependent variables
Constant pricing of premia
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2015)'s UK shadow rate
Survey expectations-based correction of premia
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2015)'s UK shadow rate
Without correction for the inflation risk premium
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
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1 2 3 4 5 6
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_10y
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -1.176** -0.695* -0.492* -0.411* -0.345* 0.043
[0.58] [0.36] [0.28] [0.23] [0.18] [0.17]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.144 -0.278 -0.270* -0.195 -0.109 0.132**
[0.36] [0.20] [0.15] [0.12] [0.10] [0.05]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.633 -0.586* -0.515** -0.409** -0.290** 0.211**
[0.45] [0.31] [0.24] [0.18] [0.13] [0.10]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.349 -0.226 -0.176 -0.157 -0.132* 0.095
[0.22] [0.14] [0.12] [0.10] [0.08] [0.18]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.406** -0.368*** -0.315*** -0.248*** -0.175*** 0.091
[0.20] [0.11] [0.08] [0.06] [0.06] [0.08]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.404*** -0.354*** -0.305*** -0.259*** -0.203*** 0.044
[0.15] [0.10] [0.08] [0.06] [0.05] [0.13]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.075 -0.001 0.034 0.032 0.012 -0.123**
[0.12] [0.09] [0.09] [0.07] [0.05] [0.06]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.224*** -0.179** -0.148** -0.122** -0.094** 0.043*
[0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.04] [0.03]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.039 -0.119 -0.136* -0.121** -0.097** 0.009
[0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.341*** -0.194** -0.131 -0.108 -0.096* -0.074
[0.08] [0.09] [0.10] [0.08] [0.05] [0.08]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.191*** -0.158*** -0.133*** -0.104** -0.071** 0.060**
[0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.253** -0.236** -0.213** -0.177** -0.139** 0.017
[0.10] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.06] [0.06]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.058 -0.085*** -0.081*** -0.061*** -0.038*** 0.035**
[0.04] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.134* -0.109** -0.089* -0.070* -0.050* 0.036**
[0.07] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.02]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.130** -0.100* -0.088* -0.071* -0.054* -0.021
[0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03]
Projections interpolated
Table A10 - Robustness: Alternative sample and specifications
Estimation subsample ending in February 2009
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Estimation subsample ending in July 2013
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Projection surprises interpolated
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (6) estimated for a different horizon with OLS.
For parsimony, only the coefficient of the interaction variable is reported. Complete tables are available
from the authors upon request.
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Raw projections
BoE's UK shadow rate
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1 2 3 4 5 6
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_10y
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.374** -0.239** -0.187* -0.177* -0.168* -0.014
[0.17] [0.11] [0.10] [0.10] [0.09] [0.13]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.336*** -0.274*** -0.235*** -0.198*** -0.153*** 0.026
[0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.05] [0.06]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.348*** -0.285** -0.257** -0.237** -0.206*** -0.043
[0.13] [0.12] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.10]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.397* -0.246* -0.173* -0.142 -0.113 0.064
[0.21] [0.13] [0.10] [0.09] [0.07] [0.14]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.353*** -0.305*** -0.258*** -0.203*** -0.144*** 0.079
[0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.04] [0.06]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.279** -0.250** -0.221** -0.188** -0.148** 0.064
[0.14] [0.11] [0.10] [0.08] [0.06] [0.11]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.428** -0.270** -0.193* -0.161* -0.131* 0.063
[0.20] [0.12] [0.10] [0.09] [0.07] [0.15]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.368*** -0.306*** -0.256*** -0.201*** -0.143*** 0.078
[0.10] [0.08] [0.08] [0.06] [0.04] [0.06]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.338** -0.280** -0.243** -0.208** -0.167*** 0.054
[0.14] [0.11] [0.10] [0.08] [0.06] [0.11]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.433** -0.272** -0.195* -0.162* -0.132** 0.062
[0.21] [0.13] [0.10] [0.09] [0.07] [0.15]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.341*** -0.295*** -0.249*** -0.194*** -0.135*** 0.082
[0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.04] [0.07]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.301** -0.266*** -0.233*** -0.199*** -0.156*** 0.062
[0.13] [0.10] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.12]
Including a VAT dummy
Table A11 - Robustness: Alternative specifications
No controls
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
No output projections
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (6) estimated for a different horizon with OLS.
For parsimony, only the coefficient of the interaction variable is reported. Complete tables are available
from the authors upon request.
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Including dummies for FG dates
BoE's UK shadow rate
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1 2 3 4 5 6
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_10y
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.396* -0.251* -0.179* -0.152* -0.126* 0.078
[0.22] [0.13] [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.15]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.305** -0.286*** -0.247*** -0.194*** -0.135*** 0.086
[0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.04] [0.06]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.277** -0.258*** -0.229*** -0.193*** -0.149*** 0.048
[0.13] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.05] [0.11]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.473* -0.304* -0.223* -0.185* -0.152* 0.038
[0.25] [0.16] [0.13] [0.10] [0.08] [0.11]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.448*** -0.329*** -0.259*** -0.200*** -0.138*** 0.136
[0.12] [0.10] [0.09] [0.07] [0.05] [0.09]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.325*** -0.263** -0.223** -0.190** -0.150** 0.08
[0.12] [0.10] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.12]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.327* -0.231* -0.16 -0.121 -0.085 0.112
[0.19] [0.13] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.16]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.222* -0.189** -0.137** -0.096 -0.055 0.136*
[0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.254* -0.173* -0.122 -0.102 -0.085 0.048
[0.15] [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.10]
BoE_ShadowRate * BoE_cpi_4 -0.349 -0.201 -0.150 -0.108 -0.067 0.025
[0.21] [0.17] [0.14] [0.12] [0.08] [0.12]
BoE_ShadowRate1 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.488*** -0.352*** -0.267** -0.216** -0.157*** 0.08
[0.16] [0.12] [0.10] [0.08] [0.05] [0.07]
BoE_ShadowRate2 * BoE_cpi_4 -0.262 -0.265** -0.258** -0.212** -0.150*** 0.027
[0.19] [0.13] [0.10] [0.08] [0.06] [0.12]
Table A12 - Robustness: Miscellaneous
Including EC sentiment measures
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (6) estimated for a different horizon with OLS.
For parsimony, only the coefficient of the interaction variable is reported. Complete tables are available
from the authors upon request.
More controls
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
More lags of the dependent variable
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
Change in private output and interest rate forecasts between t-1 and t
BoE's UK shadow rate
Wu and Xia (2016)'s UK shadow rate
Krippner (2013, 2014)'s UK shadow rate
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Figure A1 – Raw and corrected inflation expectations (in %)  
and the predicted values of the three premia (in pp) 
 
 
Note: The first row is for 1-year ahead inflation expectations, the second for 2-years ahead, and so on. 
Inflation expectations with the ZLB correction correspond to the upper two panels of Table A3 whereas 
inflation expectations estimated on the full sample correspond to the lower panel of Table A3. The different 
premia on the right-hand are the full sample ones. 
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Figure A2 – Kernel densities of the absolute value of deviations of  
BoE’s inflation projections from the BoE’s inflation target 
 
Note: A kernel density produces a smoothed estimate of the probability 
density function. The y-axis unit of the probability density function is 
the reciprocal of the x-axis unit of the variable considered: the absolute 
value of the deviation of BoE’s inflation projections at a given horizon to 
the BoE’s inflation target: 2%. 
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